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"UNDERDOG" ARBITRATION: A PLAN FOR
TRANSPARENCY
Ramona L. Lampley*
Abstract: The use of mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer,
employment, health-care, and even nursing home agreements is ever-increasing, even though
the general public has distrust and a lack of understanding of the nature of arbitration. The
Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, and then in American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant,has signaled firmly that mandatory pre-dispute arbitration is here
to stay. This is true even for individual low-value claims in which one party, say the
consumer or employee, has little or no bargaining power. I call these claims "underdog
claims." There have been numerous proposals to amend the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to
exclude such claims from mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements and numerous
criticisms raised in reaction to the Court's jurisprudence. But with the Supreme Court's
theoretical view that arbitrating underdog claims is fair, these criticisms have gone unheeded
by the majority of the Court. Now the question is how should we approach this new field of
dispute resolution in which so many claims will be resolved? This Article analyzes the
meritorious criticisms of underdog arbitration, which include bias, the repeat-player effect,
the removal of publicity, the lack of judicial oversight, and a general concern about the lack
of transparency. Then I propose a three-part solution for promoting transparency to establish
a system in which underdog arbitration can work. I propose that the FAA be amended to
require transparency in consumer and employee claims through: (1) uniform data reporting at
the arbitration service-provider level; (2) requiring a written statement of decision in such
disputes; and (3) data-reporting requirements by the business entity imposing mandatory predispute arbitration on the employee/consumer stake-holder.
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INTRODUCTION
The consumer, employment, corporate, and health-care spheres now
operate in a world in which binding individual arbitration is permitted
and widely employed.' For years the debate centered on whether pre1. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT
TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), § 2.3, at 8
(2015) [hereinafter CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY], available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201503 cfpbarbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf (finding the prevalence of arbitration
agreements at over fifty percent market share for credit cards (fifty-three percent), prepaid cards (at
least eighty-three percent), storefront payday loans (ninety-nine percent), and mobile wireless
accounts (one hundred percent); eighty-six percent of private student-loan contracts studied
contained arbitration agreements (as opposed to market share) (all figures rounded to nearest whole
number)); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 88283 (2008) (examining select consumer contracts in mobile wireless providers, credit card
companies, cable providers, and stock-trading services and finding seventy-five percent of the
consumer contracts in the sample had arbitration clauses); Michael L. Rustad et al., An Empirical
Study of Predispute MandatoryArbitration Clauses in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements,
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 643, 653-54 (2012) (finding that twenty-four percent of social
networking sites included an arbitration agreement in their terms of service or privacy policy; of
these about forty-six percent were mandatory arbitration agreements); Peter B. Rutledge &
Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2013) (finding that
95.1% of the dollar value of credit card loans (a proxy for market share) was subject to credit card
arbitration agreements, but 17.4% of issuers used arbitration agreements in their credit card
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dispute binding arbitration imposed on parties with less bargaining
power (e.g., consumers and employees) was fair as an alternative forum.
A corollary debate focuses on whether the class-action waiver/arbitration
clause is inherently unfair and unenforceable under state
unconscionability doctrines or vindication of statutory rights theories
when plaintiffs assert low-value claims that an individual would not
rationally pursue. In recent cases, most recently American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant2 and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,3 the
Supreme Court has repeatedly decided that arbitration is an adequate
alternative forum for litigants-even those who must proceed
individually with low-value claims.4 Thus, the Supreme Court has
signaled that arbitration in the consumer, employment, and even healthcare arenas is here to stay, unless eroded by legislative amendment or
regulatory action.5 The benefits and detriments of class-waiver
agreements as of 2009; since 2009 the market share has decreased as a result of the National
Arbitration Forum (NAF) settlement described below and an antitrust settlement with card issuers).
2. - U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (rejecting argument that class arbitration is necessary
to vindicate low-value statutory claims when expert costs are higher than projected individual
recovery).
3. 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
preempts California's state-law rule prohibiting class-waivers because the rule "interferes" with
arbitration by requiring class arbitration or class litigation ex post).
4. Although the prevalence of arbitration agreements in consumer products may vary across
product markets, see sources cited supra note 1, when arbitration agreements are present in
consumer agreements, they almost always include a class-action/class-arbitration waiver. See, e.g.,
CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 2.5.5, at 44 (for all product markets studied, over
eighty-five percent of contracts with arbitration agreements had no-class provisions); Eisenberg et
al., supra note 1, at 882-84 (finding that every consumer contract with an arbitration clause in the
study had a class-arbitration waiver); Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 1, at 25 (reporting that fortythree of forty-seven (ninety-two percent) credit card arbitration agreements informed cardholders
they could not be a party to a class action in court if the dispute was governed by the arbitration
agreement).
5. If we were to obtain the data and level of transparency called for in this Article, the decision as
to whether arbitration is a fair and adequate alternative forum in these contexts (e.g., no bargaining
power, inferior resources) could be based on actual evidence instead of theoretical constructions. As
for the arbitrability of medical-care claims, in Marnet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, - U.S.
, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempts state law
prohibiting agreements to arbitrate personal injury claims based on nursing home care, confirming
that hospitals, doctors, and health care facilities can require pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate. Id.
at 1203. According to the American Arbitration Association's (AAA) Healthcare Due Process
Protocol, it will not arbitrate pre-dispute mandated arbitration agreements in disputes involving
patients and a health-care provider. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, HEALTHCARE DUE PROCESS

PROTOCOL 16 (1998), available at https://www.adr.org/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GETFILE&dDoc
Name=ADRSTAGE2025859&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased ("Consent to use an ADR
process should not be a requirement for receiving emergency care or treatment. In disputes
involving patients, binding forms of dispute resolution should be used only where the parties agree
to do so after a dispute arises.").
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arbitration agreements to the consumer and to society are hotly
contested. Even as this Article was prepared for publication, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) announced that it will
propose a rule prohibiting class-action waivers in arbitration agreements

for consumer financial products and requiring more transparency in
individual arbitration awards.6 What becomes of this proposed rule will
be decided over the course of the coming year,7 but the proposal
demonstrates the opposition to class-waiver arbitration agreements and
the importance of transparency and empirical data on the regulatory
regime of arbitration versus class action.
This Article suggests that the debate should move beyond the
question of permissibility to the regulatory structures under which
arbitration should operate.8 The conversation begins with the
observation that each of the Supreme Court's decisions and academics'
arguments are based almost entirely on theories of how arbitration
should work rather than empirical data about how arbitration does
work. 9 While the body of empirical research to date is both useful in
assessing consumer arbitration and growing, it also has significant

6. Richard Cordray, PreparedRemarks of CFPB Director Richard Cordray at the Arbitration
Field

Hearing,

CONSUMER

FIN.

PROTECTION

BUREAU

(Oct.

7,

2015),

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroomi/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-richard-cordray-atthe-arbitration-field-hearing-20151007/. This drastic rule the CFPB proposes will undoubtedly
mean that most consumer financial-services companies will cease offering arbitration agreements.
This is unfortunate for the individual consumer who may have preferred a "business pays all" type
of dispute resolution process rather than to retain the ability to participate as a class member.
7. Any final rule issued by the CFPB regulating arbitration will not apply to any agreement
entered into between the consumer and the financial entity within 180 days of the new rule's
effective date. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(d) (2012). The CFPB "contemplates setting an effective date of 30
days after the rule is published." CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY
REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 22 (2015), available

at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_small-business-review-panel-packet-explainingthe-proposal-under-consideration.pdf. This means any final rule will likely not have an effect until
nearly 2017 or later, depending on how quickly the CFPB proposes its rule for comment.
8. By "debate" I primarily reference two dialogues: (1) the dialogue between courts and underdog
arbitration party-opponents in which unconscionability and vindication of statutory rights defenses
were commonly raised, and (2) the policy debate between law-makers, lawyers, stakeholders, and
academics as to the fairness of the adoption of pre-dispute arbitration agreements with class waivers
through employment agreements and terms and conditions of product sales.
9. I have argued that mandatory arbitration agreements, such as the one at issue in Concepcion,
can actually result in a framework in which the consumer is better off. See Ramona L. Lampley, Is
Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration
Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the UnsettledLegal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
477, 512-18 (2009) (arguing that the consumer is actually better off in alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) in a corporation-pays-all type agreement with a premium for winning, such as the one at
issue in Concepcion).
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limitations.1 ° One limitation is that most of the empirical research to date
is based on data from the American Arbitration Association (AAA),"'
which is a widely used arbitration administrator, but certainly not the
only administrator. This use of this empirical evidence is rare in the
Court's pro-arbitration jurisprudence. For example, in Concepcion,
Justice Scalia cited limited statistics from the AAA regarding
dispositions of actions within an eight-month period in 2007 compared

to disposition statistics for class arbitrations up to 2009 in his opinion
describing arbitration as ill suited for class proceedings. 12 Surely we can
do better than an eight-month data set as evidence of the outcomes of
individual arbitration. But this use of empirical evidence was unusual.
Most decisions addressing the adequacy of arbitration as an alternative
forum are based on no data, perhaps due to lack of comprehensive

10. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 1, at 11-14 (explaining the difficulty in obtaining
statistically significant and empirically sound evidence to evaluate arbitration); Alexander J.S.
Colvin, Employment Arbitration: EmpiricalFindings and Research Needs, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.Oct. 2009, at 6, 6 ("One problem for researchers has been the dearth of publicly available data on
which to conduct empirical research that would help evaluate the arguments of both sides of the
employment arbitration debate."). The CFPB Arbitration Study and the Searle Civil Justice Institute
(SCJI) Report on consumer arbitration are two recent empirical studies on the outcomes of
arbitration of consumer financial products and consumer products, respectively. CFPB
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1; SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION
BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION: PRELIMINARY REPORT 9 (2009) [hereinafter
SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY], available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=

ADRSTG_010205. Although those studies were based on the actual case files from the AAA, which
is a superior analytical tool than data metrics, they were limited to AAA information. See discussion
infra notes 190-98 and accompanying text. On the employment side, see, for example, CFPB
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 5.3, at 15 n.24 (collecting studies); Lisa B. Bingham,
Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, I EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 206-07
(1997) (analyzing AAA commercial and employment cases for repeat-player effect); Alexander J.S.
Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Colvin, Case Outcomies]; Alexander J.S. Colvin,

EmpiricalResearch on Employment Arbitration:ClarityAmidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS.
& EMP. POL'Y J. 405, 407 (2007) [hereinafter Colvin, Clarity] (relying on AAA data provided
pursuant to California law for empirical evaluation of employment-arbitration outcomes); Theodore
Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical
Comparison, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004, at 44, 45 (relying on AAA employmentarbitration data); Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An EmpiricalStudy of Employment
Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 777, 792 (2003) (study based on random sample of AAA employment-arbitration dispute
awards).
11. For example, many of the sources referenced in note 10, supra, rely on such data. See, e.g.,
CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 5.1, at 4; SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY,
supra note 10, at 37-38; Bingham, supra note 10, at 206-07; Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note
10; Colvin, Clarity, supra note 10, at 407; Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 10, at 45; Hill, supra note
10, at 792.
12. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011).
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research until recently. 13
This Article accepts two principles as a starting point: (1) Access to
justice through the federal and state courts for many individual
consumers or employees is unobtainable, and (2) my previously voiced
position that in certain kinds of pre-dispute class-waiver arbitration
agreements, the consumer/employee/plaintiff might be in as good a
position, if not better off, as in the courts.' 4 The main arguments
advanced against this suggestion that arbitration could be just as
beneficial to the individual litigant (as opposed to class member) are:
arbitrator bias, lack of judicial oversight, the lack of a written decision,
potential confidentiality, and the demise of the class action. The first
four of these are perpetuated from a general criticism about the lack of
transparency in consumer arbitration. However, these flaws could be
minimized by the adoption of a regulatory scheme designed to improve
transparency.
For example, arbitrator bias is theoretically presumed to stem, in part,
from the repeat-player effect. This could occur at the individual
arbitrator level or at the service provider level. Critics suggest that
arbitrators may be consciously or unconsciously influenced by the fact
that the corporate litigant is the paying party, and will not bring him or
her repeat business if the arbitrator issues a decision or award that is not
favorable to the business. 15 This "don't bite the hand that feeds you"
prognosis has some basic logic to it, but does not necessarily indicate
that all arbitrators have repeat-player bias. Much the same argument
could be made of state court judges who accept campaign contributions
from potential litigants. How are we to know if the repeat-player effect
taints the fair administration of arbitral proceedings for "underdog"
claims?16 We need transparency.
At least some history tells us that bias is real and problematic. In 2009
13. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., _ U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2304 (2013);
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740; Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005),
overruled by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
14. This is a view I have previously taken. See Lampley, supra note 9, at 512-18 (arguing that the
consumer is actually better off in ADR in a corporation-pays-all type agreement with a premium for
winning, such as the one at issue in Concepcion).
15. Jean R. Stemlight, Panaceaor Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court'sPreference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 684-85 (1996).
16. 1use the term "underdog" claims to encompass consumer and employee claims in which the
non-business entity had little or no bargaining power in accepting the mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreement. Because these arbitration agreements typically prevent participation as a
member of a class, the disputant is forced to individually arbitrate his or her claim. For low-value
claims, the rational disputant would forego the claim unless an incentive to pursue the claim is
available. See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110, overruledby Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
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the Minnesota Attorney General's office filed suit against the National
Arbitration Forum (NAF)-the then leading debt collection arbitration
forum. 17 According to the allegations, the NAF purportedly held itself
out as an impartial arbitration provider while having ties to key members
of the debt collection industry. 18 Within days, the NAF entered into a
settlement with the Minnesota Attorney General that required it to cease
arbitrating consumer debt collection cases. 19 Increased transparency in
the process will make it more likely that state attorneys general, the
Department of Justice, the CFPB, and the public can monitor arbitration
providers and ensure that the process is fair.
As the example of arbitrator bias illustrates, many of the criticisms
against underdog arbitration thrive because of the more general criticism
that arbitration simply is not transparent. This lack of transparency
means we cannot assess whether arbitration is fair. for disputants with
less bargaining power.2 ° Most arbitration disputes do not result in a
published opinion and some underdog arbitrations are confidential.2 1
Concepcion and Italian Colors both danced around this concept that
individual arbitration is "fair" without expressly invoking the term or
due process rights. But how are we to know if this largely opaque
17. Firm Agrees to End Role in ArbitratingCardDebt, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, at B8.
18. Complaint at 1-2, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum, No. 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
July 14, 2009) (on file with author).
19. Consent Judgment, Nat 7 ArbitrationForum, No. 27-CV-09-18550, 2009 WL 5424036 (July
17, 2009).
20. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 87 (2011) ("The presence of the public divests
both the government and private litigants of control over the meanings of the claims made and the
judgments rendered and enables popular debate about and means to seek revision of law's content
and application."); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration FairnessIndex: Using a Public Rating
System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of
Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985, 990-91 (2012) (acknowledging that
parties may prefer to have an award that spells out the disposition of various claims and
controversies as well as the rationale underpinning the decision). The AAA requires a statement of
the reason for employment awards, and just last year began requiring a statement of the reason for
consumer awards, as do some arbitration contracts. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
21. FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT
COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 62-63 (2010) [hereinafter FTC CONSUMER DEBT

COLLECTION REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/
life-debt/debtcollectionreport 0.pdf (stating that reasoned opinions in consumer debt collection
cases are rare, and must be requested by a party and often accompanied by a fee). This report is the
culmination of extensive research by the FTC on consumer debt litigation and arbitration, including
a 2007 public workshop to identify consumer problems and possible solutions, a 2009 report
concluding that the debt collection system was in need of serious reform, and public roundtables in
2009 in Chicago, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. bringing together numerous stakeholders in
the issues. Id. at i-ii. The FTC also solicited and received public comments. Id. at ii.
22. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., __ U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-12 (2013); AT&T
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process is fair, and hence, a truly adequate alternative forum? Professor
Judith Resnik pointed out this problem, which she characterizes as a lack
of "publicity": "Lost is the ability to assess the qualities of the
procedures and of decisionmakers and to evaluate whether asymmetries
between disputants are taken into account. ' 23 As Professor Resnik
recognizes, what is also lost is the extra benefit of publicity so that
public initiatives can remedy wrongs that go unchecked when
government enforcement is lacking. 24 There is one other downside to
arbitration's secrecy-without open access to the complaint, or decision,
it does not flag for other consumers a potential claim or a warning that
there may be a problem with the manufacturer. This reduces the
deterrent effect our court-based tort system has on manufacturers,
retailers, and service providers. Similarly, in the employment context,
the lack of publicity or transparency fails to advertise what may be
widespread discriminatory practices.
This Article advocates a tri-part solution to address these critiques: (1)
Congress should amend the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to require
that arbitral providers report data on the arbitration proceedings for
consumer, employment, and health-care claims (whether this is a claim
regarding the quality of care or an insurance dispute) and states should
enact an equivalent uniform reporting requirement; 25 (2) the FAA and
state arbitration laws should require that arbitrators "publish" online a
short statement of the decision; and (3) the FAA and state counterparts
should require data reporting by the business entities that require predispute agreements from clients, customers, and employees.
The first piece of the proposal has already been adopted by three
states and the District of Columbia. 26 Part III.A of this Article discusses
the commonalities of those state reporting requirements and includes
suggestions for improvement. With respect to the second piece of the
proposal, the "statement of decision" is intentionally not described as an
"opinion." It must set forth quite simply the applicable law and the facts
as applied to that law. The third piece of the proposal requires a baseline
of reporting by the business entities that impose the pre-dispute
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747-48, 1751-53 (2011).
23. Resnik, supra note 20, at 132.
24. Id.
25. See infra Part III.A.2 for specific data field recommendations.
26. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); D.C. CODE § 164430 (LEXIS through Sept. 16, 2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (West, Westlaw through
2015 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess.).
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arbitration on their stakeholders, whether it is employee or consumer.
This third proposal is likely to be the most controversial, but as a matter
of marketing, I am surprised it has not already occurred organically. If,
as AT&T argued in Concepcion, individual binding arbitration is just as
fair to the consumer as proceeding collectively in court, why has AT&T
not published yearly statistics on the consumer arbitration results? My
proposal would simply make baseline reporting on the corporate-user
level mandatory, much as companies must provide required information
in routine Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, in order
to avail themselves of this alternative private forum.
As an arbitration supporter myself, I am well aware that criticisms of
this proposal will abound. The critique will be that the entire design of
arbitration is to be streamlined, less expensive, and swift. A regime that
makes arbitration more similar to litigation thwarts those goals. The
response is that simple data reporting and the requirement of a statement
of decision by a person already hired (and paid) as an industry expert
will not result in this parade of horribles that will certainly be voiced.
Litigation is expensive and protracted due to multiple factors, including
extensive e-discovery, motions practice, depositions, and hearings.
Arbitration still need not entail those features to the extent required by
the state and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Disputes still could
be resolved based on little discovery or "on the papers." The requirement
that the seasoned "expert"-paid by the parties (or rather the corporate
entity under the ideal arbitration agreement) to adjudicate the disputeissue a short statement of the rule and application of law should result in
a negligible cost increase.27 And the data required by my proposal is
information that is usually already gathered during the proceedings; it
would necessitate only further completion of a form by the neutral
selected.
Nonetheless, the proposal described in this Article is not a panacea for
the funneling of consumer or employment claims to individual
arbitration. Collecting data and heightening transparency cannot "prove"
that arbitration is fair as compared to litigation, whether litigation
proceeds individually or as part of a class.2 8 And even with more
27. Although it may put some arbitrators' expertise to the test, which is part of the point.
28. For example, "[a] business win-rate of over ninety percent in arbitration does not show
arbitration is unfair if the win-rate for comparable cases in court is similar," SEARLE INSTITUTE
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 10, at 9; see also PETER B. RUTLEDGE, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR

LEGAL REFORM, ARBITRATION - A GOOD DEAL FOR CONSUMERS

11 (2008), available at

http://ssm.com/abstract=1811133 ("Studies of debt collection actions in major cities reveal that the
lender typically wins between 96% and 99% of the time, right in line with the lender win-rate data
cited in the Public Citizen Report.").
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uniform reporting requirements, there will almost certainly be challenges
in collecting and interpreting the data to understand individual consumer
arbitration more fully. 29 But gathering this data in a uniform format will
provide a useful tool for assessing the benefits of individual arbitration
versus consumer litigation.
This Article begins with an analysis of the recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence that embraces arbitration as an alternative forum, even for
low-value or underdog claims. Part II addresses criticisms of pre-dispute
arbitration, their validity, and their sources. In this Part, I emphasize that
arguments both for and against mandatory "underdog" arbitration are
grounded almost solely in theory, not on empirical evidence. Drawing on
existing empirical research and assessment of current state laws, I
propose a uniform reporting requirement for arbitration providers, a
reporting requirement for corporate players, and a uniform requirement
that arbitrators issue a statement of decision. In this proposal I address
more fully the cost/benefit analysis of my tri-part proposal, and explain
why the benefits, in enabling transparency, assessing fairness, and
preserving publicity, outweigh the costs it will impose. Part III addresses
some inherent weaknesses in data collection and assessment. Ultimately,
I conclude that the benefits that will inure from heightened transparency
justify implementation of this proposal, despite some weaknesses that
persist.
I.

WHERE WE ARE AND HOW WE GOT THERE

By now, it is no secret that the Supreme Court has given prospective
litigants a nudge, or indeed a shove, to the world of alternative dispute
resolution. This Part provides an overview of the Supreme Court's
development of the "national policy favoring arbitration."3 ° In 1925
Congress passed the FAA, which states that arbitration agreements
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.' In Prima
29. The Searle Institute Arbitration Study noted data inconsistencies in amounts claimed and
awarded in AAA datasets input by AAA case managers and the findings made in the same case files
by SCJI analysts. SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 10, at 40. This study
attributed the inconsistencies to the AAA case managers combining compensatory damages with
attorneys' fees, interest, punitive damages, and other damages. Id.
30. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see also Myriam
Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming,Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action,
104 MICH. L. REv. 373, 394-98 (2005) (chronicling the consumer-product arbitration agreement);
Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1631, 1635-46
(2005) (discussing mandatory binding arbitration in the United States).
31. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
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Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,32 the Court held
implicitly that the FAA preempts state law in federal courts, beginning
the FAA preemption doctrine.3 3 It extended FAA preemption to state
courts in Southland Corp. v. Keating.34 One year after Keating, the Court
reversed longstanding federal doctrine when it held that the FAA applied
to-and rendered enforceable-pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
antitrust claims. In MitsubishiMotors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., the Court explained that
[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum. It trades the procedures.., of the courtroom for the
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.36
After Mitsubishi Motors, the sole limitations on enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements were (1) those that arise under state-law
grounds, such as duress, fraud, or unconscionability; 37 (2) when the
prospective litigant is deprived of vindicating its statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum; 38 and (3) in cases in which Congress has
32. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
33. Id.at 400 (holding that issue of contract validity (as opposed to arbitration clause validity) is
for the arbitrator to decide, not the courts, and that this rule of "national substantive law" governs
even in the face of contrary state rule);
see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1984) (relying on Prima Paint as implying that the substantive rules of the FAA apply in state and
federal courts).
34. 465 U.S. 1, 8, 12 (1984) (preempting a state statute requiring judicial, rather than arbitral
resolution).
35. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
36. Id.
at 628.
37. The FAA provides that arbitration agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity" for the revocation of any contract, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012), which refers to
general state contract law defenses. Justice Thomas interprets this clause of the FAA as limited to
only state contract defenses that concern the formation of the agreement, such as fraud, duress, or
mutual mistake. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1755
(2011).
38. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637 ("[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its
remedial and deterrent function."). Justice Scalia all but eviscerated the "effective vindication"
doctrine in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,_ U.S. _, 133 S.Ct.2304 (2013),
when he characterized the quoted language as dicta. Id. at 23 10. In footnote two, Scalia rejected the
characterization of the "effective vindication" doctrine as part of Mitsubishi Motor's holding:
Contrary to the dissent's claim ...the Court in Mitsubishi Motors did not hold that federal
statutory claims are subject to arbitration so long as the claimant may effectively vindicate his
rights in the arbitral forum. The Court expressly stated that, "at this stage in the proceedings,"
it had "no occasion to speculate" on whether the arbitration agreement's potential deprivation
of a claimant's right to pursue federal remedies may render that agreement unenforceable.
Id. at 2310 n.2 (citations omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19).
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specifically restricted statutory claims from arbitration.39
In the years following Mitsubishi Motors, the Court upheld arbitration
agreements arising out of other protective statutes such as section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,4° the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 4 1 and section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933.42 The Court's pro-arbitration stance extended to age
43
discrimination claims in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
despite the plaintiffs argument that arbitration would not serve the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's (ADEA) broad purposes without
the class device or the broad equitable relief afforded through the courts.
Then in 1996 in Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto,44 the Court held that
the FAA's command that arbitration agreements be placed on the "same
footing" as other contracts preempted a Montana law that would render
unenforceable arbitration agreements unless notice of the agreement was
typed in underlined letters on the first page of the contract.45
Then came Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,46 a
classic case of an underdog plaintiff contesting an adhesion pre-dispute
39. See, e.g., Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309 ("No contrary Congressional command requires
us to reject the waiver of class arbitration here."); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, __ U.S. _,
132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) ("[The FAA] requires courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate according
to their terms ... even when the claims at issue are federal statutory claims, unless the FAA's
mandate has been 'overridden by a contrary congressional command."' (internal citations omitted));
Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627 (holding that "it is the congressional intention expressed in
some other statute on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to which
agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable"). For example, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act precludes pre-dispute exclusive arbitration agreements in
residential-loan contracts. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c) (2012). Other examples include 9 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2)
(pre-dispute arbitration agreements not enforceable for commodity whistleblower claims); 10
U.S.C. § 987(e)(3), (f)(4) (2012) (rendering arbitration agreements unenforceable for military
members and families for payday loans and consumer-credit contracts, other than residential
mortgages and car loans); 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (precluding automobile-dealer franchise predispute arbitration agreements); and 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e) (2012) (precluding waiver of rights and
remedies of whistleblower claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, including by pre-dispute
arbitration agreement). See also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARiz. L. REV.
161, 199 n.92 (2015).
40. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
41. Id.
42. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
43. 500 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1991).
44. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
45. Id. at 683, 687 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)). Requiring
conspicuous notice of agreements to arbitrate, particularly in the consumer or employment context,
may indeed be a laudable goal. To be sure, the prominence of the arbitration agreement is a factor in
the unconscionability analysis. Congress could easily accomplish this goal by permitting states to
require the notice to be conspicuous in the special situations of "underdog" claims.
46. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
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arbitration agreement. The Green Tree plaintiff was a consumer
purchaser of a mobile home.4 7 She financed the transaction through a
financial services company.4 8 She alleged the defendant failed to
disclose a finance charge in violation of federal law. 49 She also argued
that the arbitration agreement should not be enforceable because its
silence as to cost allocation posed a risk that high arbitration costs would
prohibit her from vindicating those federal rights.5 ° Consistent with its
pro-arbitration trajectory, the Court held that Randolph had not met the
requisite level of proof to show that the existence of potentially large
vindicating her
arbitration costs would preclude her from "effectively
51
forum."
arbitral
the
in
rights
statutory
federal
During this same time frame, the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, the
presence of arbitration agreements in the sale of consumer products and
employment agreements was on the rise. During this twenty-year time
frame, one notable feature became dominant-the presence of the class
waiver. 52 The enforceability of the class-waiver arbitration agreement
was hotly contested in the lower federal courts and state courts primarily
on two grounds: unconscionability and the "effective vindication"
doctrine stemming from Mitsubishi Motors.53 For over a decade many
courts treated the class waiver as inherently unconscionable. California
courts even applied the "Discover Bank rule" which rendered
unenforceable arbitration agreements in which
the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a
setting in which disputes between the contracting parties
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is
alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has
47. Id. at 82.
48. Id.

49. Id. at 84.
50. Neither party disputed the arbitration clause's applicability to all claims, even statutory
claims, arising under the contract, and Ms. Randolph did not contend that the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA) evinces a clear intention by Congress to preclude waiver of judicial (or class) remedies. Id.
at 90.
51. Id.
52. For a history of the evolution of the class-waiver arbitration agreement, see, for example,
Gilles, supra note 30, at 394-98; Jeffrey A. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass

Arbitration, 76 U. CN. L. REv. 383, 398 (2008) ("The practical consequences of the new legal era
were significant. Arbitration left the province of particular business guilds or commercial
environments and shifted to a massive privatization of the adjudicatory function .... [A] genre of
new arbitration arose, in which arbitration agreements were essentially imposed upon a large,
general class of consumers and workers.").
53. See, e.g., Lampley, supra note 9, at 503-10 (analyzing the evolution and use of arbitration
agreements in consumer products and services).
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carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of
consumers out of individually small sums of money.5 4
But in very recent cases, the Court has all but eviscerated these defenses.
First, in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,55 the Court held that a
"delegation clause"-granting the arbitrator the exclusive authority to
decide the enforceability of the arbitration agreement itself, instead of a
court-was enforceable.5 6 Traditionally, attacks on the validity of a
contract as a whole were issues for an arbitrator to decide, but attacks on
the gateway issue of enforceability of the arbitration agreement were for
the court. 57 The Rent-A-Center Court held that this traditional division of
gateway issues could be modified by contractual agreement, delegating
authority to the
arbitrator to determine issues of arbitration agreement
58
enforceability.
Then came AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, in which the Court
held that the FAA preempted the aforementioned "Discover Bank rule,"
because it "stands as an obstacle" to the FAA's objectives. 59 The Court
rejected Justice Breyer's dissenting argument that "class proceedings are
necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip
through the legal system" because even if that result is desirable, states
cannot require it through a procedure inconsistent with the FAA.6 ° The
Court actually went so far as to declare nonconsensual class arbitration
as inconsistent with the FAA because it sacrifices informality for slower,
more costly, and more complex decisions that carry greater risks. 6 1 And
the Court made a point of observing the specific consumer-friendly
tenets of the AT&T agreement, including AT&T's incentive payment of
$7500 and double attorney's fees if the claimant received an arbitral
award greater than AT&T's last settlement offer. The district court
found that the plaintiffs were actually "better off' under this arbitration
agreement than as a member of a class, "which 'could take months, if
not years, and which may merely yield an opportunity to submit a claim
54. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), overruled by AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
55. 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
56. Id. at 72-73.
57. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
58. A party could raise a defense to the enforcement of the delegation clause under Rent-ACenter, which would still raise a gateway issue of enforceability for the courts, but a general attack
on the arbitration agreement itself would be subject to the otherwise enforceable delegatoryarbitration agreement. Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72.
59. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1751-53.
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for recovery of a small percentage of a few dollars.' ' 62 And the Ninth
Circuit stated that aggrieved consumers who filed claims were
"'essentially guarantee[d]' to be made whole. ' 63 While Concepcion
could not have wholly removed unconscionability as a general contract
defense to a truly one-sided arbitral agreement, it did significantly limit
the contours under which that defense could be asserted. No longer is the
argument that arbitration agreements are unfair because they remove the
class device valid. This is true even for traditionally "underdog" claims.
Following Concepcion, many observers claimed that the consumer
class action was dead.64 But for federal statutory claims, opponents of
the class-arbitration waiver found cover in Mitsubishi Motor's
"vindication of statutory rights" doctrine. As applied to low-value
claims, the theory went that it would be irrational to pursue an individual
claim through arbitration when the cost of arbitration outweighed the
potential recovery. Hence, the removal of the class device precluded the
litigant's opportunity to vindicate statutory rights. Two years after
Concepcion, the Court struck a deathblow to this argument in American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.65 Although Italian Colors did
not involve a typical "underdog" claim, it did involve the claims of
individual small business owners against the monolithic American
Express. The claims of those small business owners resembled underdog
claims because the merchants had no negotiating power and were
allegedly coerced into "take it or leave it" agreements with American
Express. The small business-owner merchants wanted to sue American
Express for antitrust violations based on American Express's alleged
improper tying agreements, by which American Express required a
merchant to accept its credit card if a merchant was going to accept the
more lucrative charge card. 66 But they wanted to proceed collectively.
And they had each signed agreements requiring them to arbitrate
individually. The merchants claimed that due to exorbitant expert fees
needed to prove their antitrust claims, it would be too expensive to bring
these claims individually in arbitration. Thus, the merchants argued,

62. Id. at 1753 (quoting Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1 167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL
5216255, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff'd sub nom.Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d
849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740).
63. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Laster, 584 F.3d at 856 n.9).
64. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 39, at 199 (predicting that after Concepcion and Italian
Colors, businesses will adopt class waivers "en masse against consumers and employees" insulating
themselves from class liability).
65. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., _ U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2304 (2013).
66. In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig. (Amex 1), 554 F.3d 300, 307-08 (2d Cir. 2009).
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depriving them of the class device prohibited vindication of their rights
under the federal antitrust statute.67
The Court disagreed, holding that the vindication of statutory rights
"exception" applies only to the "prospective waiver of a party's right to
pursue statutory remedies." 68 The class-action waiver did not eliminate
the right to pursue that remedy. 69 As the Court succinctly put it, "the fact
that it is not -worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy
does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy. 7 °
But the Court's opinion did not stop there. Justice Scalia's
characterization of the vindication of statutory rights doctrine as "judgemade" "dictum" in Mitsubishi Motors calls into question the entire
propriety of the vindication of statutory rights doctrine all together-at
least if it were applied to render an arbitration agreement
unenforceable. 71 The Court recognized some situations in which the
exception would be applicable-a provision in an arbitration agreement
forbidding the assertion of statutory rights, for example, or filing and
administrative fees that were so high such that access to the forum were
prohibitively expensive.72 But those examples are the extremes and do
not "save" the underdog claims that are irrational to pursue in light of
arbitral costs. The Court reminded us that this issue was "all but
resolv[ed]" in Concepcion: "We specifically rejected the argument that
class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims 'that might otherwise
slip through the legal system.' 73 The Court reiterated this holding as if
to give strength to what could have been characterized as dicta in
Concepcion. At least in the majority's view, the argument that without
the class device underdog claims will go unprosecuted is not a basis for
refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement.
The significance of these pro-arbitration decisions is magnified by
other Roberts Court opinions. In Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v.
Brown,74 the Court easily overturned a decision by the West Virginia

67. Brief for Respondents at 2, Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 267025, at
*2.

68. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)).
69. Id. at2311.
70. Id. (emphasis in original).
71. Id. at 2310.
72. Id. at 2310-11.
73. Id. at 2312 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740,
1753 (2011)).
74. __ U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam).
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Supreme Court holding that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are
unenforceable when they involve claims for personal injury or wrongful
death against a nursing home. 75 The per curiam decision merely
reinforced FAA preemption doctrine, which was almost a foregone
conclusion after Concepcion. But Marmet removed any doubt that predispute arbitration agreements are enforceable for personal injury
claims, including medical malpractice claims.76 And as discussed above,
in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc. 77 the Court held that the same
parties who agreed to arbitrate individually could not contractually
enlarge the grounds for judicial review of the arbitral award.7 8 Hall
Street also cast significant doubt on whether "manifest disregard of the
law" remains a ground for vacating an arbitral award, because it is not
specifically enumerated in section 10 of the FAA. 7 9 The very narrow
limitations for review or modification of an arbitral award, even if the
parties have otherwise agreed, is an effective grant of authority from the
Court to arbitrators to do what they will without interference by courts or
the rule of stare decisis.
The Court's message conveyed through Concepcion and Italian
Colors, and to a lesser degree, Marmet and Hall Street, is loud and clear.
Arbitration is here to stay. This is true for consumer products and
services. This is true for employer/employee claims. This is true for
contracts in which the litigant has waived an opportunity to participate
75. Id. at 1203. In its scathing opinion, the Court wrote, "[t]he West Virginia court's
interpretation of the FAA was both incorrect and inconsistent with clear instruction in the
precedents of this Court." Id. The West Virginia Supreme Court had based its holding on its errant
conclusion that:
Congress did not intend for the FAA to be, in any way, applicable to personal injury or
wrongful death suits that only collaterally derive from a written agreement that evidences a
transaction affecting interstate commerce, particularly where the agreement involves a service
that is a practical necessity for members of the public.
Id. (quoting Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 291 (W. Va. 2011)).
76. Some state courts continue to apply state public policy grounds to invalidate arbitration
agreements. See infra note 189. In an interesting twist on the issue of state law preemption, a
California court of appeals held an arbitration agreement unenforceable under the contract language
providing that if the state law rendered the class-arbitration waiver unenforceable, the entire
arbitration agreement is unenforceable, because California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act
(CLRA) precludes waiver of the class action. But to the extent the CLRA imposes class arbitration
on parties without agreement, it is preempted by the FAA, which would mean the contractual class
waiver does not offend state law. Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 195 (Ct. App.
2014). The Supreme Court granted certiorari review from the state court of appeals decision in
March 2015. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 135 S. Ct. 1547 (2015).
77. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
78. Id. at 586.
79. See Timothy Dyer, "Manifest Disregard"Alive and Well?,c 17 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 82
(2014).
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as part of a class. This is even true for low-value arbitration claims. If
the parties agreed to pre-dispute individual arbitration, absent some
element of fraud, duress, or oppression, the Court would look favorably
upon that agreement. And with this new era of mandated approval of
arbitration agreements, it is time to accept that individual arbitration for
"underdog" claims may be here to stay, and may even be a feasible
system in which to operate. It is time for a new approach in which
academics and lawyers work within the existing system and find a way
to fashion an alternative dispute forum that works.
II.

INDIVIDUALIZED ARBITRATION OF UNDERDOG
CLAIMS: SOME NOTEWORTHY CRITIQUES

The cases discussed above show that, at least for now, the Supreme
Court has fully embraced individual arbitration (through the class
waiver) for low-value claims, even if it means that some claims will slip
through the cracks. Yet the foundation of these cases is the theoretical
idea that arbitration, as a court alternative, is adequately fair.80 The
genesis of the Discover Bank rule at issue in Concepcion was due to a
concern about fairness-the California Supreme Court held that it was
inherently unfair, indeed unconscionable, for a party with superior
bargaining power to "deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out
of individually small sums of money" through an adhesion contract in
which a consumer agreed to individual arbitration and waived the
opportunity to participate as a member of a class.81 Certainly, even after
Concepcion, states are free to determine whether arbitration agreements
are subject to general contract law defenses, including the
unconscionability defense. 82 But states cannot apply their
unconscionability doctrines in a way that stands as an obstacle to the
FAA's role.83
Even beyond this preemption-based holding, however, the Supreme
80. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011); see also
Resnik, supra note 20, at 132 ("The Justices did not use the phrase 'due process,' ... yet their
judgments and disagreements entailed considering the quality of procedures, the asymmetries
between disputants..., and the relevance of access and publicity, all of which are dimensions of
the due process analyses set forth at the outset."); id. at 93 ("[AII nine Justices assessed what
fairness requires, in resources and in process, in or out of public courts.").
81. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100,

1110 (Cal. 2005)).
82. Id. at 1748 ("Although § 2's saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, it
does not suggest an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA's objectives.").
83. Id.
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Court reiterated the district court's finding that the plaintiffs were "better
off under their arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would have
been as participants in a class action. .. 'which may merely yield an
opportunity to submit a claim for recovery of a small percentage of a
few dollars." 84 By couching its holding in terms of the utilitarian benefit
to the plaintiff, the Court reaffirmed its theoretical assumption that
arbitration is a perfectly fair alternative forum to litigation.
That theoretical assumption is not new. It formed the bedrock of the
Supreme Court's pro-arbitration jurisprudence beginning with
Mitsubishi Motors. There the Court grounded its holding on the
assumption that arbitration is a fair substitute for litigation:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It
trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom 85for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration.

This recognition of the fairness of the arbitral forum also percolates into
the Court's holding in Italian Colors. In rejecting the argument that class
arbitration is necessary to prosecute small-value claims, the Court noted
that "[t]he class-action waiver merely limits arbitration to the two
contracting parties. It no more eliminates those parties' right to pursue
their statutory remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the
class action for legal relief in 1938,,,86 even though the economic effect

of that result will mean that some individual, low-value claims will not
be asserted individually.87 To drive home this point, the Court suggested
that an arbitration provision forbidding the assertion of certain statutory
rights would fail the "effective vindication" doctrine (to the extent it still
exists), as would "perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached
to arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum
impracticable. '8 8 Each of these examples involves elements that would
render arbitration inaccessible and unfair as a litigation alternative.
What is interesting about this underlying assumption that arbitration
84. Id. at 1753 (emphasis in original) (quoting Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cvl 167 DMS
(AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff'd sub nom. Laster v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'dsub nom. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740).

85. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
86. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., _ U.S.

,133 S.Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013).

87. Id. at 2312 (rejecting argument that class arbitration is necessary to prosecute claims "that
might otherwise slip through the legal system" (quoting Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1753)).
88. Id. at 2310-11.
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is a fair alternative forum, even for underdog cases, is that the Supreme
Court relied on no empirical evidence of outcomes suggesting that
arbitration may be a fair alternative forum. 89 It just seems, particularly
on the face of consumer-friendly arbitration agreements like that at issue
in Concepcion, that arbitration should be an adequate alternative forum
to litigation.
And herein lies the problem. Criticisms of pre-dispute individual
arbitration abound. They are no more inconceivable than the idea that
arbitration itself should be fair. But again, there is no evidence, no data,
and no proof that confirms the existence of the criticisms. However,
these criticisms highlight the need for more information about underdog
arbitration agreements and outcomes. This Part of this Article will
describe the main tenets of the most prominent criticisms of underdog
arbitration: the class-waiver, arbitrator bias, lack of judicial oversight,
lack of a written opinion, and the potential for confidentiality, many of
which stem from the current regulatory system in which arbitration is
not transparent.
A.

The Class- Waiver: Fair?Economical? Rational? Who Knows?

One of the central problems raised by underdog arbitration is the
almost uniform implementation of a clause requiring the consumer to
waive the right to participate as a member of a class in court or in
arbitration, i.e. the class waiver. 90 Opponents of this type of clause argue
that individual low-value claims will not be brought if the sole option is
to bring those claims as an individual disputant in arbitration. 91 The
89. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (citing AAA statistics for length of time toward dispute
resolution, but offering no analysis of the prevalence of or outcomes data for low-value consumer
claims).
90. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 39, at 199 (predicting that after Concepcion and Italian Colors,
businesses will adopt class waivers "en masse against consumers and employees," insulating
themselves from class liability); Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining
"Consumer-Friendly" Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME

L. REV. 825, 868 (2012) ("The pragmatic point is that rights will not in fact be vindicated if we ban
collective action." (emphasis in original)); Gilles, supra note 30, at 430 ("Allowing companies to
simply opt out of exposure to collective litigation is no more defensible than a system in which
corporations may decide whether they wish to be exposed to federal antitrust, securities, or civil
rights laws."); Resnik, supra note 20, at 127 (criticizing Concepcion and discussing the negative
ramifications of the class waiver); Stemlight, supra note 30, at 1652 ("Given these benefits of class
actions, it is clear that by eliminating the class action option, companies increase plaintiffs' costs of
pursuing a claim and thereby make it more difficult, if not impossible, for them to bring claims
against the company.").
91. This was the central issue in Italian Colors. See supra notes 65-73, 81 and accompanying
text.
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proposal detailed in this Article will not fully address the fairness
concerns raised by those who oppose the arbitration-with-class-waiver
device, but the Article would miss a piece of the argument without at
least raising the criticism.
One point is worth making however-if we are to base our judgment
of the class device trade-off with an assessment of dispute resolution
economies, we simply do not have enough empirical information to
conclude that the class waiver is a disservice to consumers. Indeed, a
few points from the recent CFPB Arbitration Study show that for the
time being, we should remain open to the idea that private dispute
resolution on an individual basis may be an acceptable alternative to the
imperfect class device. First, approximately sixty percent of the
consumer financial products class actions filed ended in a non-class
settlement or potential non-class settlement (i.e., withdrawal or dismissal
by the plaintiff); approximately twelve percent (sixty-nine cases)
reached an approved class-action settlement. 92 This means that only a
small portion of class actions that are filed result in any damages to the
class-member consumer. Second, looking at a broader data set of
consumer financial class-action settlements from 2008-2012, the
average claims rate (claims made as a percentage of eligible class
93
members) was low, twenty-one percent, with an eight percent median.
Thus, even when consumers obtain a settlement through the class device,
they usually do not take the administrative steps to obtain the payout.
Third, the consumer survey reflects that the dispute resolution process
matters little to consumers in product selection (at least for credit cards)
and that most consumers do not know if they can sue in court or are
subject to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.94 This

92. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 6.6.1, at 36-39, 40 fig. 11. The CFPB Arbitration

Study analyzed 562 consumer financial products putative class cases filed between 2010-2012; it
identified an outcome for 478 of those cases by the study date. Id. at 36; id. § 6.5, at 16-18
(describing methodology). Of those, none went to trial on the merits. Id § 6.2.2, at 7. Ten were
resolved against the company on motion, but only three (0.63%) of those were on a class-wide
basis. Id. Additionally, of those ten resolved on the merits, seven were through default judgment. [d.
§ 6.6.1, at 37-38. It is also worth noting that in 94 of the 562 class actions studied, companies
moved to compel arbitration; 46 of such motions were granted in full or in part. Id. § 6.7.1, at 5758.
93. Id. § 8, at 5; § 8.3.4, at 30. Assessing claims rate is difficult and has some limitations as
acknowledged in the CFPB Study. Id. § 8.3.4, at 30 & n.49. Thus, the CFPB advises that these
numbers should be viewed as a floor, because it may underestimate the actual rate. But the data
reflect that consumers fail to capture much of the settlement relief offered. Id.
94. Id. § 3.1, at 3 (finding that consumers did not volunteer "dispute resolution procedure" as a
feature important to their decision to obtain the credit card they use most often, and this factor
ranked lowest when the consumer was asked to identify important features out of a list).
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information, while only representative of a small segment of the market,
shows that consumers care little at the point of purchase about
preserving the right to participate as a class, and perhaps more
surprising, that the majority of consumers are not seeking class recovery
even when it is available to them through a settlement decree. If the
findings of the CFPB study regarding class action settlements are
indicative of other markets, the class action is a flawed device for
making the consumer whole. This makes the CFPB's rule proposal to
ban class waivers in consumer financial services arbitration agreements
seem like a very drastic remedy, because it will effectively mean that
95
financial entities cease providing for pre-dispute arbitration altogether.
In past writings, I have taken the view that business-funded
arbitration with a litigation incentive can leave a consumer better off
than he or she would be as a member of a class. 96 The Supreme Court in
Concepcion agreed (admittedly, without empirical information on
arbitration outcomes).97 While a full discussion of the fairness concerns
of the class waiver in consumer and employee arbitration agreements is
beyond the scope of what can be adequately addressed in this regulatory
proposal, increased data about underdog arbitration will inform that
central debate in a much needed way.
B.

Bias: You Don 't Bite the Hand that Feeds You

One of the main criticisms of arbitration in "underdog" claims is that
the arbitrator or arbitral forum will be biased. 98 As noted in the
Introduction, nowhere is this more evident than in the claims lodged
against the NAF for misrepresenting its neutrality in debt collection
cases when it was affiliated with the New York hedge fund that also
95. Alan S. Kaplinsky, Our Thoughts on Director Cordray's Arbitration Comments to the
CFPB 's
Consumer
Advisory
Board,
CFPB
MONITOR
(Oct.
22,
2015),

https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2015/10/22/our-thoughts-on-director-cordrays-arbitration-commentsto-the-cfpbs-consumer-advisory-board/.
96. Lampley, supra note 9, at 512-18. An incentivizing clause typically promises a premium to
the consumer and/or attorney's fees if the consumer wins more in arbitration than the company's
last
settlement
offer.
See,
e.g.,
Netflix
Terms
of
Use
§ 15(e),
NETFLIX,
https://www.netflix.com/TermsOflise (last updated Sept. 15, 2014); Wireless Customer Agreement

§ 2.2(4),

ATT.COM,

http://www.att.com/legal/terms.wirelessCustomerAgreement.html#

disputeResolutionByBindingArb (last visited Oct. 22, 2015).

97. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Stemlight, supra note 30, at 1649 ("There are virtually an infinite number of ways
in which a company, as the drafting party, can try to use an arbitration clause to gain the upper
hand, including arbitrator selection, imposition of high costs, and limitation of remedies. While it
would be wrong to suggest that most of these excesses are included in most arbitration clauses,
some of them are quite common.").
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owned the country's largest debt collection enterprises. 99 The Minnesota
Attorney General's complaint alleged that the NAF worked closely with
creditors to (1) encourage them to file arbitration claims as an alternative
way to collect debt from consumers; (2) draft arbitration clauses, advise
creditors on arbitration legal trends, and in some cases, help them draft
claims to be filed against consumers; and (3) refer them to debt
collection law firms, which then file arbitration claims against
consumers in the Forum.' 00 The NAF ultimately settled this lawsuit,
agreeing to stop accepting all consumer arbitrations. 101
The cases against the NAF, which used to be one of the top three
arbitral forums in the United States, show that we cannot ignore the bias
critique. In addition to bias due to financial ties, critics have long argued
that with arbitration in which the employer or manufacturer is likely to
be a repeat player, bias is structural. 0 2 Employers, manufacturers, and
retailers that enforce arbitration agreements are more likely to be "repeat
players" than individuals, typically "one-shot" players: The CFPB
Arbitration Study to Congress found that in consumer financial services
and product disputes filed in 2010-2011, heavy repeat players
"dominated" arbitration filings, constituting over eighty percent of case
filings. 0 3 The repeat player has an advantage in arbitrator selection
1°4
because it is more familiar with the pool of potential arbitrators.

99. Complaint, State v. Nat'l Arbitration Forum, No 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 14,
2009) (on file with author).
100. Id.
101. See Firm Agrees to End Role in ArbitratingCardDebt, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, at B8.
102. See, e.g., Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916,

936 (1979) ("A system of private selection would be disadvantageous to employees, since an
arbitrator could improve his chances of future selection by deciding favorably to institutional
defendants."); see also Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("If an
arbitrator is likely to 'lean' in favor of an employer-something we have no reason to suspect-it
would be because the employer is a source of future arbitration business."); Lisa Blomgren Amsler,
Combating Structural Bias in Dispute System Designs that Use Arbitration: Transparency, the

Universal Sanitizer, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 32, 41 (2014) (concluding that adhesive
arbitration bears indicia of structural bias because the disputant with superior economic control
takes unilateral control over designing the dispute system for conflicts, and the arbitration
agreements restrict recourse to the public civil justice system by typically removing collective
action options).
103. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 5.6.12, at 59. "Heavy" repeat players are those
that appeared in four or more disputes from 2010-2012. Notably, "heavy" repeat consumer
attorneys constituted forty-five percent of all filings, representing a trend in representation in this
market. Id.
104. See Richard A. Bales & Sue lrion, How Congress Can Make a More Equitable Federal
ArbitrationAct, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1081, 1094 (2009). Bales & Irion dub this "submerged bias."
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Empirical studies confirm that repeat players do tend to win more than
one-shot players, at least in employment arbitration, but are inconclusive
as to the cause for this effect. 10 5 For example, simpler, faster procedures
10 6
in arbitration may incentivize employees to bring lower-value claims.

Additionally, the availability of dispositive motions in pre-trial litigation
practice may lead to the dismissal of weaker cases, reflecting a higher
overall win rate at trial. 10 7 The repeat player may also fare better in the
process because it has had an opportunity to learn from prior procedures
and improve its strategy, potentially settling weaker cases to pursue the
Professor Elizabeth Hill coined this the "appellate
stronger ones.'
effect" in her empirical study of two-hundred AAA employment
cases.' 0 9 Professor Hill found that employers who repeatedly arbitrate
did tend to win more frequently than one-shot players, but only two of
the two hundred cases in her sample involved an arbitration involving
the same company and arbitrator. 0 The fact that only one percent of the
parties were truly repeat players with each other means that arbitrator
bias to the repeat party should not have demonstrated an effect. But Hill
also found the win-loss record for those repeat employers who
maintained an in-house dispute resolution program culminating in AAA

105. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 10, at 213 (finding that in repeat player cases, employees
won something only sixteen percent of the time, compared with a sixty-three percent employee win
rate overall, and that employees dealing with non-repeat players recovered an average of forty-eight
percent of what they demanded, while employees dealing with repeat players recovered only eleven
percent of what they demanded); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the
Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV.
223, 239 (1998) [hereinafter Bingham, On Repeat Players] ("The repeat player effect is a cause for
concern because in dispute resolution, sometimes the perception of fairness is as important as the
reality. There is undeniably a repeat player effect in employment arbitration."); Colvin, Clarity,
supra note 10, at 412-17, 430, 434 (finding employee win rate of 32% against one-shot employers
compared to 13.9% against repeat-player employers, and only 11.3% where the repeat-player
employer was paired with a repeat arbitrator; finding 2% win rate when a repeat employer was
paired with a repeat arbitrator against a pro se claimant). But there may be many factors contributing
to these differential outcomes, such as the strength of the claims, the settlement rate, and award
ratio.
106. Colvin, Clarity, supra note 10, at 417.
107. Id.
108. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyoitz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer
Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 843, 862 (2010) (collecting empirical studies and
observing that "[o]verall, the empirical evidence tends to support the existence of a repeat-player
effect, but suggests that the effect may be due to case screening by repeat businesses rather than
repeat-arbitrator or repeat-player bias"); see also Bingham, On Repeat Players, supra note 105, at
241; Colvin, Clarity,supra note 10, at 417-18.
109. Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration:A FairForum at Low Cost, DISP. RESOL. J.,
May-July 2003, at 9, 15.
110. Id.
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arbitration to be much higher than those repeat employers without an inhouse program.111 Thus, according to Hill, the "effect appears to be the
result of the selection processes of large employers' in-house dispute
by-product of large employers'
resolution programs, not merely ' 1the
2
arbitration."'
at
appearances
repeat
Additionally, the arbitrator may be more inclined to side with the
repeat player (even subconsciously) because that entity is likely to be the
source of repeat business if a favorable decision is reached. Professor
Jean Sternlight has dubbed this the "repeat provider" problem." 3 The
basic premise is that companies typically designate the provider of
arbitration services in their arbitration agreement. Both the arbitrator and
the provider will be paid for the services performed, the arbitrator will
receive fees, and the provider will earn administrative fees or possibly
even a percentage of the fees charged by the arbitrator. 114 If the company
is unhappy with a ruling from an arbitrator, or even a provider, the
company has an incentive to refuse to select that particular arbitrator
again, or, over time, to choose a different provider. 15 As Professor
David Schwartz points out, the more palpable concern "is that arbitrators
will reduce their awards to increase their chances of being rehired by any
future defendant." ' 1 6 Thus, "every defendant is functionally a repeat
player" to the extent information about prior decisions is available to
potential disputants." 7
Similarly, Professor Lisa Blomgren Amsler examined the common
provisions of adhesive arbitration agreements under the "dispute system
design" (DSD) framework. 118 Amsler argues that "[s]tructural bias in

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Sternlight, supra note 30, at 1650 (explaining the "repeat provider" effect).
114. Id.

115. Id. ("Thus, charge the critics, providers have a financial incentive to make sure that the
company is pleased with the results in arbitration.").
116. David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247,
1311 (2009) (emphasis in original); see also Larry J. Pittman, MandatoryArbitration: Due Process
and Other Constitutional Concerns, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 853, 856 (2011) ("Arbitrators know that
repeat players are more likely to choose them either if the arbitrator has ruled in the repeat players'
favor during past arbitrations or if they are likely to rule for them during future arbitrations.").
117. Schwartz, supra note 116, at 1311.
118. Amsler, supra note 102, at 35-42. According to Amsler:
DSDs generally fall into one of three categories: (1) a court, agency, or other third party
designs it for the benefit of disputants (third party design); (2) two or more disputants subject
to the system jointly design it (all disputants or parties design); and (3) a single disputant with
stronger economic power designs it and imposes it on the other disputant (one party design).
Id. at 40.
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DSDs may depend on (1) who is designing the system; (2) what their
goals are, and (3) how they have exercised their power." 1 9 Using this
approach, she concludes that adhesive arbitration bears indicia of
structural bias because the disputant with superior economic control
takes unilateral control over designing the dispute system for conflicts;
the arbitration agreements restrict recourse to the public civil justice
system; and adhesive arbitration clauses typically remove collective
action options. 120 Like myself, Professor Amsler believes that the
1 21
potential for bias presents the need for additional transparency.
Increased transparency can help the public evaluate the extent of repeatplayer bias, and help the public avoid arbitrators and arbitration service
providers who have repeatedly found in favor of one repeat player. This
perception that private, pre-dispute mandatory arbitration is subject to
inherent bias is perpetuated by two other factors that lead to its wide
criticism-the lack of judicial review and public distrust of the court
alternative.
C.

Whatever Happenedto JudicialOversight?

Mandatory arbitration with class waivers in underdog claims is also
criticized for its finality.122 Members of Congress have expressed a
similar concern, stating: "Mandatory arbitration undermines the
development of public law because there is inadequate transparency and
inadequate judicial review of arbitrators' decisions. 123 Judicial review

119. Id.
120. Id. at 41.
121. See generally id at 51-55 (arguing that "transparency can be a powerful tool for controlling
the abuse of power" and offering examples of ways to achieve transparency).
122. Thomas V. Burch, Manifest Disregardand the Imperfect ProceduralJustice of Arbitration,
59 U. KAN. L. REV.47, 75 (2010) (proposing that courts review all awards in "mandatory arbitration
for legal error under the manifest-disregard standard"); Pittman, supra note 116, at 872 (noting that
"another way that courts can provide more protection to ensure fairness in arbitration is to engage in
a more exacting level of judicial review of arbitration awards"); Stephen J.Ware, Default Rules
from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 720-27
(1999) (recognizing that arbitrators often do not "follow the law" and proposing that "[t]he Court
must either reverse its decisions that claims arising under otherwise mandatory rules are arbitrable,
or require de novo judicial review of arbitrators' legal rulings on such claims"); Nancy A. Welsh,
Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural
Safeguards, 42 SW.L. REV. 187, 207 (2012) ("[J]udicial deference to arbitrators and the outcomes
they produce becomes especially worrisome when arbitration draws its efficacy from the
enforcement power of the state and the arbitrators' and arbitral organization's role is due to their
special relationship with just one of the parties, usually the more powerful repeat player.").
123. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S.878, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013).
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of an arbitral award is very narrow.1 24 The finality of the arbitral award
leads to public distrust and criticism among consumer or employee
advocates.
Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA prescribe the exclusive grounds for
vacating or modifying an arbitral award which, 125 according to the Court
in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., cannot even be modified by
agreement of the parties. 126 This limited review "maintain[s] arbitration's
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway."12 7 Otherwise the
to a
perceived simplicity of arbitration would become "merely a prelude
28
process."'
review
judicial
time-consuming
and
more cumbersome
Under Section 10 of the FAA, the sole grounds for vacating an
arbitral award are when there was evident corruption, fraud, or undue
means in the procurement of the award or in the arbitrators themselves;
when the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or failed to make a "mutual,
final, and definite award" on the matter; or when the arbitrators are
"guilty of misconduct" in procedural matters such as refusing to hear
29
evidence or postpone a hearing.1
Notably, the first two grounds speak to corruption, undue means, or
bias. But absent the flagrant bribery charge, how can the appealing

124. Even when a court agrees to hear a review of an arbitral award under the very limited
grounds set forth in notes 129 and 133, infra, "courts overturn only about 10% of arbitration awards
reviewed under the [FAA]." Lindsay Melworm, Biased? Prove It: Addressing Arbitrator Bias and
the Merits of Implementing Broad Disclosure Standards, 22 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 431,
441 (2014) (citing Platt W. Davis II1, Nondisclosure of Arbitrator Conflicts and the 'Evident
Partiality"Standard, CPA J., June 2004, at 54, 55).
125. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (2012).
126. 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008). Hall Street was a bit of an anomalous result in the arbitration
world, where although almost everything can be negotiated by contract, the grounds for judicial
review cannot. Id.Of course, the Court hinted that there may be some leeway around the narrow
scope of review based on the FAA under state statutes, or even based on the Court's inherent casemanagement power under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, id. at 590-92, and parties could
contract around this altogether by providing for arbitral review of an award that is egregious by
some metric.
127. Id. at 588.
128. Id.
129. Section 10 provides that the sole grounds for vacating an arbitral award are:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(l)-(4).
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litigant ever prove bias? What is notable about the second two grounds is
what is lacking-judicial review for an arbitral decision based on a
manifest disregard of the law or clear abuse of discretion. Under the
grounds as given, an award cannot be vacated even if it ignores stare
decisis or mistakes the facts presented. Further, Hall Street casts
significant doubt on whether "manifest disregard of the law" remains a
ground for vacatur, because it is not specifically enumerated in section
10.130 Thus, even under the "exceeds powers" provision of section 10(4),
the Court has held that the party seeking award vacatur "bears a heavy
burden" because a showing of error, "even a serious error," will not
provide grounds for vacating the award. 13 1 It is only when the arbitrator
acts outside his "contractually
delegated authority" that this ground
132
award.
the
vacating
permits
Section 11 mitigates section 10 somewhat by providing that awards
may be modified in certain circumstances. Awards may be modified if
there is evident miscalculation or an evident material mistake
surrounding the description of a person, thing, or property.' 33 Also under
section 11, awards can be modified if the arbitrator based an award on a
matter not submitted to arbitration (unless it is a matter not affecting the
merits) or when the award's form is imperfect in a way not affecting the
merits. 34 But even under section 11, a decision cannot be reversed if
wrongly decided provided that the arbitrator did not engage in fraud,
misconduct, corruption, was not biased, and acted within his or her
powers.
Although the veritable lack of appeal from arbitration is often
criticized, the decision to appeal a court-resolved case is often an
economic decision, not a guarantee. Professor David Schwartz estimates
135
the federal appeal rate to be one appeal for every fourteen cases.

130. See Dyer, supra note 79.
131. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013).
132. Id. (quoting E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000)).
133. Section 11 provides for review:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material
mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a
matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.

(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.
9 U.S.C. § 11.
134. Id.

135. Schwartz, supra note 116, at 1281 ("To the extent that arbitration is faster and cheaper than
litigation, the restrictions on appeal are undoubtedly a factor, but one that is all too easily

exaggerated.").
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While the lack of judicial appeal troubles consumer-rights and
employee-rights proponents, there is some evidence to suggest that
defendants fare better on appeal from court trials than plaintiffs,
meaning that consumer plaintiffs may not benefit from more liberal
grounds for arbitral appeal.' 36 While the proposal below will not entirely
cure the concern about limited judicial oversight of arbitration awards,
requiring detailed data reporting about arbitration outcomes and a
written statement of decision will inform us as to how strong of a
criticism the lack of judicial oversight is. Are arbitrators engaging in
manifest disregard of the law? Even if they are, requiring a written
statement of decision should curb abuse. To what extent would an
increased route of judicial appeal cure fairness concerns? To answer
these questions we need to know more about what is occurring in
individualized arbitration.
D.

Preservingthe Rule of Law

One other problem with widespread mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
of consumer claims is the erosion of the rule of law.137 Arbitration
typically requires no written, reasoned decision. 138 This is perpetuated by
the lack of judicial review and by the desire to avoid unnecessary delay
and expense in a process that by its nature should be streamlined and
cost-effective. 139 The grand sphere of power given to private arbitrators
136. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil
Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 947, 948 (2002)
("Defendants that appealed their losses after trial obtained reversals at a 28% rate, while losing
plaintiffs succeeded in only 15% of their appeals, with the spread increasing to 31% and 13% for
appeals from jury trials.").
137. Stemlight, supra note 30, at 1661 ("Even if it could be shown that mandatory arbitration
were beneficial for many or potentially all consumers and employees who had claims, some argue it
would still be detrimental to society in that it curtails the use of public (sometimes jury) trials and
eliminates the development of public precedent.").
138. MARTIN DOMKE ET AL., 1 DOMKE ON COMMERICAL ARBITRATION:

THE LAW AND

PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 34:7, at 34-18 (3d ed. 2015) ("Arbitrators are not
required to state the reasons for their award, and commercial arbitration awards, unlike labor
awards, are rarely accompanied by written opinions." (citations omitted)); see also FTC CONSUMER
DEBT COLLECTION REPORT, supra note 21, at 62-63 ("Arbitrators issue awards at the conclusion of
the proceeding, but they are not required to accompany their awards with an opinion setting forth a
statement of the law and an application of the law to the facts."). What the FAA does require is a
final and definite award. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).
139. See Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in PrivateJudging, 38 S.TEX. L. REV. 485, 529 (1997) ("It is a
familiar enough proposition that an arbitrator's freedom from the need to explain or justify his
award is closely linked to his lack of accountability in terms of judicial review: The naked award
that is the norm in domestic commercial arbitrations can be explained as much by a desire to
insulate decisions from judicial scrutiny as by any desire to avoid the delay or added expense that
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with no requirement to follow stare decisis, no requirement of a public
decision, and virtually nonexistent concern about reversal, feeds into the
concern that the system fosters bias. As Professor Resnik put it:
"[P]rivate dispute resolvers are left to do as they wish ....[T]he public
face of private dispute resolution largely depends on what providers
decide to put forth., 140 The lack of a written opinion was one of the main
tenets behind the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, which
stated that "[m]andatory arbitration is a poor system for protecting civil
rights and consumer rights because it is not transparent. While the
American civil justice system features publicly accountable decision
makers who generally issue written decisions that are widely available to
the public, arbitration offers none of these features." 14'
In contrast, courts are transparent. Filings and hearings are generally
open to the public. Although juries do not issue reasoned decisions, their
verdicts are public. 142 Judicial opinions are published and even the
unpublished opinions are accessible. This transparency informs the
parties and the public regarding how the law is both interpreted and
applied. 143 The decisions send a signal to the public about the merits of
potential cases and the likelihood of a damages award or attorney
general action. Public decisions also serve as a guide to future decisionmakers that may be binding, or may be merely persuasive, but at least

written opinions would entail.").
140. Resnik, supra note 20, at 108 (acknowledging that California has a requirement that
arbitrators "'collect, publish..., and make available to the public' information about parties,
categories of disputes, time to disposition, and outcomes") (alteration in original) (citing CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2011)). Under this 2002 enactment, the AAA complies by providing
quarterly reports including nationwide data. See also D.C. CODE § 16-4430 (LEXIS through Sept.
16, 2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MD.
CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). Providers do not,
however, provide compreh'ensive data. See CAL. DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., CONSUMER AND
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: A REVIEW OF WEBSITE DATA POSTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION
1281.96 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 5
(2004), available at

http://www.mediate.com/cdri/cdriprintAug_6.pdf.
141. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 11 th Cong. § 2(6) (2009).
142. Arbitration, while private, is not automatically confidential. Amy J. Schmitz, Untanglingthe
Privacy Paradoxin Arbitration,54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1211 (2006) (stating arbitration is private
in that it is a closed process, but it is not confidential because information revealed during the
process may become public). Unless the parties agree otherwise, or the arbitrator provider requires
confidentiality, there is no reason why arbitral awards cannot become public and reported by the
press just as are verdicts.
143. See Stemlight, supra note 30, at 1662 ("[O]ur public court hearings educate the public and
potential wrongdoers as to how the law is being interpreted, thereby deterring potential wrongdoers
from violating the law, educating victims as to their rights, and inviting the public to take action to
help reform the law should it not be satisfied with public results.").
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are present.' 44 This social good is lost when decision-making is
privatized and not public as it often is in arbitration.
The arbitration industry response to these criticisms seems to validate
the critique. The AAA, one the nation's leading arbitration providers for
dispute resolution, recently imposed the requirement that "[t]he award
shall provide the concise written reasons for the decision unless the
parties all agree otherwise" in consumer disputes.145 It has had a similar
rule for employment disputes since 2009.146 The rule requiring written
reasons for arbitral decisions is very new-it became effective
September 1, 2014-and appears to still be somewhat at odds with
Principle 15 of the AAA's Consumer Due Process Protocol, which
conditions the provision of a "brief written explanation of the basis of
the award" on a party request. 47 The comments accompanying
Consumer Due Process Protocol Principle 15 note the "tension between
the desire for confidentiality in arbitration ... and the need to provide
Consumers access to information regarding arbitrators" and arbitration
administrators. 148 The tension is in the default rule. Under the Due
Process Protocol the default is to provide a written explanation of the
award on party request; under the Consumer Arbitration Rules, the
default is to provide "concise written reasons" for the award unless the
parties agree otherwise. 149 Notably the AAA may choose to publish an
award rendered under these Rules; however, the names of the parties and
witnesses will be removed from awards that are published, unless a party
agrees in writing to have its name included in the award. 50
The Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services' (JAMS) Minimum

144. See Mark Edwin Burge, Without Precedent: Legal Analysis in the Age of Non-Judicial
Dispute Resolution, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 143, 176 (2013) (advocating scaling back the
predominance of the stare decisis model in legal pedagogy due to the growth of administrative law
and arbitration decisions and arguing that arbitrators need not even follow the law).
145. AM. ARBITRATION

ASS'N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION

RULES

27-28, R.

43 (2014)

[hereinafter CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES], available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty
?nodeId= /JCM/ADRSTAGE2021425&revision=latestreleased. The new rules were effective
September 1, 2014.
146. AM.

ARBITRATION

ASS'N,

EMPLOYMENT

ARBITRATION

RULES

AND

MEDIATION

PROCEDURES 29, R. 39(c) (2009), available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=/
UCM/ADRSTG_004362.
147. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL 3, Principle 15.3 (1998)

[hereinafter CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL], available at https:/adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF
?doc=ADRSTG_005014 ("At the timely request of either party, the arbitrator should provide a brief
written explanation of the basis for the award.").
148. Id. at 31 (providing reporter's comments to Principle 15).
149. CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 145, at 27-28, R. 43.
150. Id. at 28, R. 43(c).
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Standards of Procedural Fairness in consumer arbitration requires that
the award "provide a concise written statement of the essential findings
and conclusions on which the award is based."' 5' JAMS has a similar
requirement for employment cases.152 As noted above, the NAF no
longer accepts consumer arbitration disputes.
Additionally, corporate imposers of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
are beginning to see the usefulness of a written decision requirement.
For example, the Netflix Arbitration Agreement (which is
inconspicuously nestled in Paragraph 15 of its Terms of Use) requires
the arbitrator to "issue a reasoned written decision sufficient to explain
' 53
the essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based.'
But Verizon Wireless's Customer Agreement does not require an
arbitrator to issue a written decision and also limits the effect of an
arbitration award: "An arbitration award and any judgment confirming it
it can't be used in any other case except
apply only to that specific case;
54
to enforce the award itself."'
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently adopted a
recommendation that arbitrators should issue reasoned opinions to
accompany awards in all debt collection arbitrations.155 According to the
FTC, the "opinions" should "state the law applied, explain the
application of the law to the facts, and set forth a calculation of the
amount awarded."'' 56 A separate question is what precedential effect
these "opinions" should have on future cases. The FTC opined that
"[b]ecause most of these opinions would involve relatively limited and
case-specific factual disputes ...[they] would not ordinarily be wellsuited for use as precedent in future proceedings."' 5 7 That principle may
not necessarily hold up for all debt collection proceedings and is
certainly not applicable to all consumer arbitrations.

151. JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-DISPUTE CLAUSES
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 3, Standard 10 (2009), available at

http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMSConsumerMin
2009.pdf. These standards became effective on July 15, 2009. Id.

Stds-

152. JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES 22-23, R. 24(h) (2014),

available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS employment
arbitration rules-2014.pdf (requiring a "concise written statement of the reasons for the Award,
stating the essential findings and conclusions on which the Award is based").
153. Netflix Terms of Use, supra note 96, § 15(e).
154. Customer

Agreement

(7),

VERIZON,

http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/support/

customer-agreement (last updated Aug. 18, 2015).
155. FTC CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION REPORT, supra note 21, at 64.
156. Id. (footnote omitted).
157. Id.

2015]

TRANSPARENT "UNDERDOG" ARBITRATION

1759

Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole would take the recommendation for a
written decision one step further. She proposes that arbitration providers
require arbitrators to "draft reasoned written opinions. 'l 8 Professor
Cole's proposal would require the arbitrator to identify the issues in
dispute, use the parties' post-hearing briefs and hearing evidence to
identify the parties' contentions, state the decision, interpret the
evidence, resolve questions of fact, apply principles of law and custom,
and explain why he or she accepted or rejected the parties' theories. 5 9 In
addition, the opinion must describe the award and its consequences for
the disputants. 16 Requiring some type of written decision by an
arbitrator can reduce the concern about developing and preserving the
rule of law, and serve as a guidepost for potential corporate error. But
addressing this issue is complicated by the issue of confidentiality.
E.

The Confidentiality Problem

Requiring a written decision does nothing to increase public
awareness of the issue or deter conduct if the decision is confidential.
The implementation of confidentiality provisions in consumer arbitration
agreements perpetuates both the distrust of the system and an erosion of
public cognizance to deter improper corporate behavior.' 6 1 Although
arbitration is private, it is not automatically confidential unless the
parties agree or the rules of the arbitral provider require
confidentiality. 62 But the concern that arbitral outcomes will remain
secret is worrisome with respect to employment discrimination claims,
consumer claims, and claims that affect public health and safety. 6 3
In early generation pre-dispute arbitration cases, the party opposing
arbitration would frequently argue that a confidentiality clause rendered
the agreement unenforceable. 64 Many courts have held confidentiality
clauses in consumer or employment arbitration agreements

158. Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Federalizationof Consumer Arbitration:PossibleSolutions, 2013
U. CHL LEGAL F. 271, 326-27 (2013).
159. Id.at 304-05.

160. Id.
161. Amy J. Schmitz, Assuming Silence in Arbitration, N.J. LAW., Apr. 2011, at 16, 18

("Arbitrators' bare awards fail to provide the parties with direction regarding future behavior. Lack
of published opinions in arbitration also may allow for privatization of the law.").
162. Schmitz, supra note 142, at 1211.
163. Schmitz, supra note 161, at 18.
164. Susan

Randall,

Judicial Attitudes

Toward Arbitration and the

Resurgence

of

Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 185, 218 (2004) ("Many arbitration agreements provide that
the arbitration proceedings and the award must be kept confidential.").
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unconscionable. 165 But as if to reinforce the assumption that arbitration,
by its nature, is confidential, the Court in Stolt-Neilson S.A. v.
a
AnimalFeeds International Corp., 166 cast confidentiality as 67
"presumption" that would be diluted by forced class arbitration.
Additionally, arbitrator ethical rules impose confidentiality duties on
arbitrators. 168 Yet in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,
the viability of the confidentiality agreement in the business-to-business
arbitration agreement was a matter of some concern to the Court at oral
argument and in the courts below. 16 9 As the case bounced from Supreme
Court to the Second Circuit over the course of nine years, American
Express adopted the argument that costs of individual arbitration were
not prohibitively high because the individual plaintiffs could share the
costs of expert preparation. 170 For example, individual plaintiffs could
pool resources in selecting an expert, who would then develop a
common expert report to address common issues. While the Second
Circuit found this argument "intriguing," the court held that it conflicted
with the express language of the agreement prohibiting disclosure of
165. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding a "secrecy provision"
unconscionable, in part because "the unavailability of arbitral decisions may prevent potential
plaintiffs from obtaining the information needed to build a case of intentional misconduct or
unlawful discrimination against [the defendant]"); Zuver v. Airtouch Commc'ns, Inc., 153 Wash. 2d
293, 315, 103 P.3d 753, 765 (2004) (holding confidentiality provision in employment contract
unconscionable because "keeping past findings secret undermines an employee's confidence in the
fairness and honesty of the arbitration process and thus, potentially discourages that employee from
pursuing a valid discrimination claim"); Randall, supra note 164, at 218 n. 128 (collecting cases).
166. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
167. Id. at 686 (reasoning that "[u]nder the Class Rules, the presumption of privacy and
confidentiality that applies in many bilateral arbitrations shall not apply in class
arbitrations,... thus potentially frustrating the parties' assumptions when they agreed to arbitrate"
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
168. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES

7, Canon VI(B) (2004) [hereinafter AAA COMMERCIAL DISPUTES ETHICS], available at
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=fUCM/ADRSTG 003867 ("The arbitrator should
keep confidential all matters relating to the arbitration proceedings and decision."); cf CONSUMER
DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 147, at 3, Principle 12 ("Consistent with general expectations
of privacy in arbitration hearings, the arbitrator should make reasonable efforts to maintain the
privacy of the hearing to the extent permitted by applicable law." (emphasis added)). Recognizing
the "tension" between confidentiality and consumer need for data on arbitration and information on
arbitrators, the reporter's comments note that "[allthough confidentiality of hearings may be
considered an advantage of arbitration, there is no absolute guarantee of confidentiality." See id at
28 (providing reporter's comments to Principle 12).
169. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-21, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., __ U.S.
133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133).
170. In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 318 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted,
, 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010),
vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., _ U.S.
rev'd,Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2316.
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arbitration documents and filings to any other party. 171 In the oral
argument to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts posed the
question as to whether a trade association or multiple claimants could
72
collectively fund an expert report to be used by individual claimants.
American Express conceded that the confidentiality
agreement would
73
not prohibit such collective expert funding.'
The extent of the "confidentiality problem" is not yet clear. The
CFPB Arbitration Study found that most consumer financial product
arbitration agreements it studied did not have confidentiality provisions,
but checking-account arbitration agreements with confidentiality
agreements still covered twenty-eight percent of the market. 74 This may
depict a move against confidentiality, at least in the consumer context.
Some arbitration agreement drafters have already learned from the cases
declaring the confidentiality clause in "underdog" cases to be
unconscionable and have not required confidentiality in their consumer
agreements. 75 But as the language from Verizon Wireless's arbitration
agreement set forth above shows, corporate entities still desire to limit
the precedential effect of arbitration on other cases. In order to dispel the
opaqueness of arbitration, the minimal benefit gained through
confidentiality is something that business disputants should forgo for
entry to the alternative dispute arena.
Most of the criticisms discussed above-bias, lack of judicial
oversight, erosion of the rule of law, and confidentiality-stem, in part,
from a concern that little is known about the process and outcome of
underdog arbitration. Although the class waiver critique does not stem
directly from lack of transparency, it is built on the theoretical idea that
individual arbitration is unfair. But we lack empirical data that confirms
or denies this theoretical concern. By passing legislation to increase
transparency in underdog arbitration, Congress and state legislatures can
171. Id.

172. Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 169, at 20-21.
173. Id. ("Our position is that multiple claimants in arbitration could share the costs of an expert
for preparation of a report."). But see Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2316 ("The agreement also
disallows any kind of joinder or consolidation of claims or parties. And more: Its confidentiality
provision prevents Italian Colors from informally arranging with other merchants to produce a
common expert report.") (Kagan, J., dissenting).
174. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 2.5.8, at 52.
175. See, e.g., Netflix Terms of Use, supra note 96, § 15(e); Wireless Customer Agreement, supra

note 96, § 2.2(4). According to the CFPB's Arbitration Study, most of the arbitration agreements in
the scope of its study did not include nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements. CFPB
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 2.5.8, at 52-53. Analysis of the prevalence of confidentiality
agreements in consumer and employment pre-dispute arbitration agreements is another area in
which it would be useful to have more empirical evidence.
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give the public, lawyers, academics, and government agencies the
information needed to either dispel the myth of arbitration unfairness or
confirm the necessity for increased regulation.
III.

A CALL TO CONGRESS: A LITTLE TRANSPARENCY FROM
MY FRIENDS

As set forth in the discussion above, many of the criticisms of
underdog arbitration stem from the lack of transparency and oversight in
the process. To date most critics have argued that arbitration should be
off-limits for underdog claims through state unconscionability doctrines
or the federal vindication-of-statutory-rights doctrine.' 76 But the
Supreme Court has held that state courts may not treat arbitration clauses
with hostility even for underdog claims and has effectively foreclosed
the argument that the class waiver precludes vindication of statutory
rights. 177 Critics also argue that the FAA should be amended to preclude
application to underdog claims. This has not been successful. 178 This
lack of success in excluding underdog claims is not surprising given
various lobbying group efforts, the diversion of Congress's attention
elsewhere, and the lack of empirical evidence that arbitration is unfair or
inaccessible to the average consumer. In response, many observers agree
that the need for transparency is now at the forefront. How are we to
achieve this transparency? What data set would be beneficial for
prospective analysis? Building on the work of others in this area, I
propose a neutral and workable paradigm for Congress and the states to
implement with the goal of obtaining greater transparency and
knowledge of this process to which many consumer and employee
claims are being relegated.
I propose that (1) Congress amend the FAA to require that arbitral
providers report data on the arbitration proceedings for consumer,
employment, and health-care claims (whether this is a claim regarding
the quality of care or an insurance dispute), and states should enact an
equivalent uniform reporting requirement; (2) the FAA and state
arbitration laws should require that arbitrators "publish" online a short
statement of the decision; and (3) the FAA and state counterparts should
176. See Gilles, supra note 30, at 399-404; Stemlight, supra note 15, at 686-87. Even if the
vindication-of-statutory-rights defense had prevailed in Italian Colors, it would only provide a
defense based on federal statutory rights, not state law claims.
177. See supra Part I.
178. But, as stated above, see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text, next year the CFPB will
propose a rule banning class-action waivers in consumer financial services pre-dispute arbitration
agreements.
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require data reporting by the business entities that require pre-dispute
agreements from clients, customers, and employees.
A.

The Seemingly Obvious Solution: MandatedDataReporting

In light of the theoretically valid criticisms of arbitration explored
above-arbitrator bias, lack of judicial oversight, and lack of publicity to
the consumer or employee spheres-the solution is seemingly obvious.
America needs to see the data. And the data needs to come from those
with access to it, the arbitration service providers. While I would very
much like to claim authorial pride in the novelty of this idea, it is not
novel. Nor is it unduly burdensome. California, Maine, Maryland, and
the District of Columbia have already enacted such data-reporting
requirements. 7 9 California's law has been in effect since 2002. The
Maine and Maryland statutes are of more recent vintage, 2012 and 2011
respectively, no doubt reflecting the increasing public awareness of the
lack of arbitral transparency. 180 Additionally, the FTC recommended in
its 2010 study of consumer debt collection practices, including
arbitration, that Congress consider creating a nationwide system
forums to report and make public arbitration awards
requiring arbitration
181
and decisions.
The state statutes, not surprisingly, have many commonalities. They
all apply to consumer arbitrations, but also have provisions that purport
to reach employment arbitrations. For example, Maine's statute, the
most recent, applies to "Providers of Consumer Arbitrations."' 182 It goes
on to require disclosure of the employee's annual wage range "if the
dispute involved employment" even though the statutory title and scope
do not explicitly govern employment disputes. 183 The state statutes
generally require the providers to collect and publish in a publiclyavailable "computer-searchable format": (1) the name of the
179. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); D.C. CODE
§ 16-4430 (LEXIS through Sept. 16, 2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess.).
180. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903.
181. FTC CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION REPORT, supra note 21, at v.
182. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394(1).
183. Id. This imprecision in legislative drafting could lead to questionable applicability. Cf CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (stating that it applies to "publication of consumer arbitration
information" but also requiring data on employee claims in section 1281.96(a)(3)); D.C. CODE § 164430 (requiring information from an arbitration organization on "each consumer arbitrationit has
administered or otherwise been involved in" but also indicating "employment" as a type of dispute
(emphasis added)); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (applying only to consumer arbitration).
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nonconsumer party and if the party is a business entity; (2) the type of
dispute involved; (3) the wage range of the employee in an employment
dispute; (4) whether the consumer prevailed; (5) the number a times a
business disputant had previously appeared in a proceeding before the
arbitral provider; (6) whether the consumer was represented by an
attorney; (7) the dates the provider received the demand, appointed the
arbitration, and the date of disposition; (8) the disposition (withdrawal,
settlement, award with hearing, award without hearing, default,
dismissal, etc.); (9) the amount of the claim; (10) the award or relief
amount if any; (11) the name of the arbitrator; (12) the arbitrator's fee;
(13) the percentage of fee allocated to each party; 8 4 and (14)
[w]hether the provider has or within the preceding year had a
financial interest in a party or the legal representation of a party
in the arbitration or a party or legal representative of a party in
the preceding year had a financial
the arbitration has or within
185
interest in the provider
(included, no doubt, to attempt to prevent another NAF debacle).
California's amended Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.96, effective
this year, requires providers to disclose whether the arbitration was
demanded pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration clause and more detailed
information regarding the type of claim, award, and fee waivers. 186 It
also requires private arbitration companies to make the information
available in a format that allows the public to search and sort the
directly accessible from a link
information, and to make the information
187
on the company's internet website.
But the state statutes are flawed. First, the FAA may preempt these
state efforts regulating arbitration service providers.188 My proposal
recommends that Congress, followed by state legislatures, adopt a
uniform data-reporting requirement. Federal amendment of the FAA to
require data reporting disposes of the ancillary preemption argument.
But why require data reporting at the state level? Uniform state adoption
184. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96; D.C. CODE § 16-4430; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1394; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903.
185. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394(1)(K).
186. Act effective Jan. 1, 2015, ch. 870, 2014 Cal. Stat. 93 (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1281.96).
187. Id.
188. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (declaring arbitration agreement to be enforceable except upon general
contract defenses). The general import of the FAA is that arbitration agreements cannot be treated
with more hostility than regular contracts. But does that mean the State cannot regulate arbitration
providers? That question is one worthy of an article in and of itself, although the FAA gives little
guidance.
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promotes uniform implementation among arbitral providers that may not
(arguably) rise to the interstate commerce level.' 89 Uniformity among
the legislative acts is essential, and compliance with the federal mandate
should satisfy any corollary state reporting requirement. Many arbitral
providers have national or multi-state practices. For data reporting to
work in an effective way, the provider should report, but in a "one size
satisfies all" fashion.
One might ask why legislatively require data reporting at all? The
AAA, which is one of the more widely used consumer arbitration
providers,' 9" already provides data on arbitration disputes, as does
JAMS. 19 1 The AAA provides this information due to the California and
Maryland arbitration reporting laws discussed above. 192 But relying on
this data alone, while informative, does not give legislators, academics,
practitioners, or the general public information about the full picture of
arbitration. Indeed, one could argue that because the AAA embraces
consumer-friendly procedural mechanisms-such as fees capped at $200
for the consumer' 93 and special rules governing consumer cases194-that
businesses seeking either to act unfairly toward consumers through
arbitration or to have data publicly reported would avoid selecting the
189. See, e.g., Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd., 155 P.3d 16, 31 (Okla. 2006) (holding that a
nursing home agreement does not fall within interstate commerce, thus the FAA did not preempt
Oklahoma law precluding pre-dispute arbitration agreements for nursing home care); Bradley v.
Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 318 (S.C. 2012) (residential real estate contract for sale of
completed home did not involve interstate commerce, thus not subject to FAA). Bruner was likely
wrongly decided, but the point remains that state courts continue to hold that certain state contracts
are governed by state law and do not fall under the FAA because the economic activity does not rise
to the level of interstate commerce. Would a representation agreement between a local lawyer and a
client involve interstate commerce such that the FAA would control? In Royston, Rayzor, Vickery,
& Williams, LLP v. Lopez, No. 13-1026, 2015 WL 3976101 (Tex. June 26, 2015), the Texas
Supreme Court declined to impose a public policy requirement that attorneys explain arbitration
agreements to prospective clients, despite a professional ethics oinion stating that such an
explanation is required. Id. at *2. The court never discussed the FAA or preemption doctrine.
190. Actual data confirming that the AAA is the "most" widely used arbitration service provider
is hard to come by, perhaps proving the point. The CFPB Arbitration Study found that the AAA was
the most commonly named administrator in the consumer financial products markets it studied, but
in most product markets, it was designated as the "sole" arbitration administrator in less than fifty
percent of the contracts studied. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 2.5.3, at 34-40.
191. Consumer Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS'N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/
aoe/gc/consumer (follow "Consumer Arbitration Statistics" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 21, 2015);
Consumer Case Information, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/consumercases/ (last visited Oct. 21,
2015).
192. Consumer Arbitration Statistics,supra note 191.
193. CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 145, at 33-36. The new rules were effective
September 1,2014.
194. Id.
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AAA.

As an example of just how large this missing market share of
unreported data might be, the CFPB found that a significant portion of
arbitration agreements studied did not designate the AAA as the sole
administrator. Only 18.3% of storefront payday-loan contracts, 16.7% of
private student loan contracts, and 37.3% of prepaid cards studied
designated the AAA as the sole administrator, although most of the
contracts studied specified the AAA as either a sole administrator or
potential administrator. 195 But a significant market portion also identified
JAMS as a potential arbitration administrator. 196 And some specified no
sole administrator. Some credit card agreements even identified the NAF
as the sole administrator even though the NAF stopped administering
consumer arbitration more than five years ago! 197 By relying on only
AAA (or JAMs) data, we obtain a limited piece-a piece potentially
skewed by selection bias-of the consumer-arbitration picture.1 98
Thus, the AAA data does not provide the public with a
comprehensive view of consumer arbitration and its outcomes. But even
the AAA data-collection mechanism has flaws that could be improved
with this proposal. For example, the AAA disclaims any guarantee of
accuracy or completeness of the data it provides. 199 And the AAA data

identifies a number of case dispositions as "administrative"

or

"withdrawn" without further explanation as to the case disposition.200

Finally, other studies have found that the data entered in the AAA

195. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 2.5.3, at 35-38.
196. Id. (showing over fifty percent of the market share for credit cards, checking accounts, and
payday loans had arbitration agreements that identified JAMS as an alternative).
197. Id. at35.
198. The CFPB Arbitration Study and the Searle Institute Arbitration Study noted that relying
solely on AAA data for arbitration "outcomes" analysis was a limitation for this very reason. CFPB
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 5.1, at 4; SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY, supra
note 10, at 2, 38 (recognizing that the results of any AAA study are not necessarily representative of
all consumer arbitrations because other arbitration providers may attract different types of cases and
different types of businesses).
199. Consumer Arbitration Statistics, supra note 191 ("The AAA has not reviewed, investigated,
or evaluated the accuracy or completeness of the arbitrator's/arbitrators' determination of the
'prevailing party' and makes no representations regarding the accuracy or completeness of this
information.").
200. Provider Organization Report, AM. ARB. ASS'N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/
aoe/gc/consumer (follow "Consumer Arbitration Statistics" hyperlink; then follow "Provider
Organization Report" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 22, 2015) (noting an "administrative" disposition
in 944 of 18,915 consumer arbitrations and "dismissed," "impasse," or "withdrawn" for significant
portions of the data set); see also CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 5.2.2, at 11 (finding
that in more than one third of disputes the AAA case records ends in a manner consistent with
settlement, but we cannot know whether there was a settlement in any of those cases).
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comprehensive consumer-arbitration statistics database have some
inconsistencies in data points, such as amount claimed and amount
awarded.20 ' In sum, relying on AAA data is useful to the extent it gives
us a very informative view of the murky world of consumer arbitration,
but it has significant limitations that could be improved on by this
proposal.
1.

Data Reporting: The Necessity of a Penaltyfor Failureto Comply

History tells us that even though law may require data reporting, that
does not mean providers comply. Ten years after the enactment of
California's data reporting statute,20 2 a study commissioned by the
California State Assembly Committee on the Judiciary found that "the
great bulk if not all companies that appear to be doing mandatory
consumer arbitrations in California are not complying with the law, and
there are many shortcomings in the data., 203 As recognized by the
California State Assembly study, a statutory requirement without civil
penalty is hardly a requirement at all.20 4 According to the U.C. Hastings
College of Law Public Law Research Institute study relied on in the
Committee report, half of the private arbitration companies conducting
business in California fail to post any of the information required by the
statute, and of those that do attempt to disclose data, none fully
complies. 20 5 The failures in transparency are significant. For example, of
the companies who do report, most fail to disclose the amount of the
20 6
claim, a factor that is critical in evaluating award fairness.
Additionally, nearly half of the reporting companies do not consistently
report the frequency with which the business party has previously used

201. See SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 10, at 40 (noting the levels of
inconsistencies between the AAA data set and the case file sample reviewed for the project).
202. CAL. CIV.PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
203. KEVIN G. BAKER, ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMM., MANDATORY CONSUMER ARBITRATION:
HAS COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA'S LANDMARK DATA TRANSPARENCY LAW BEEN SUFFICIENT
TO
ACCOMPLISH
THE
LEGISLATURE'S
GOALS?
1
(2013),
available
at
http://ajud.assembly.ca.gov/sites/ajud.assembly.ca.gov/files/reports/Arbitration%2Data%2OBackgr
ound%20paper.pdf.
204. Id. at 8 (noting that the significant omission of required data may continue to foster

skepticism of mandatory consumer arbitration and could create a race to the bottom in which the
most egregious violators of the data-reporting requirement have a competitive advantage).
205. Id. at 7-8 (citing DAvID J. JUNG ET AL., REPORTING CONSUMER ARBITRATION DATA IN
CALIFORNIA 1, 5-7 (2013), available at http://gov.uchastings.edu/docs/arbitration-report/2014arbitration-update).
206. Id. (citing JUNG ET AL., supranote 205, at 11-12).
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the arbitration provider. 0 7 Even though the California legislature
amended the private arbitration disclosure requirement effective this
year to require more specificity in categorical reporting and disclosure in
a publicly useful format, it failed to enact a civil penalty for failure to
comply.20 8 These failures invite the issue
of transparency. If arbitration
20 9
really is fair, why the failure to report?
Therefore, the FAA data-reporting requirement should include a civil
penalty for failure to comply. For example, Maryland's civil penalty
statute provides that failure to - comply with its data-reporting
requirement "[m]ay be considered as a factor in determining whether a
consumer arbitration agreement is unconscionable or otherwise
unenforceable under law.,' 2 0 And, the statute provides for a private right
of action such that "[a] consumer or the Attorney General may seek an
injunction to prohibit an arbitration organization that has engaged in or
is engaging in a violation of § 14-3903 of this subtitle from continuing
or engaging in the violation." 21 Even so, a private right of enforcement
or the fact that underreporting can be considered as a factor in an
unconscionability action are hardly penalties that would give a lucrative
but potentially biased arbitral provider pause. The data-reporting
requirement I propose should attach a significant penalty: If the
arbitration service provider is substantially non-compliant with the
requirement, the consumer can enjoin enforcement of the provisions
selecting that particular service provider and may, in the consumer's
discretion, choose another arbitral service provider. While this potential
remedy does affect the business disputant, who may have little control
207. Id. (citing JUNG ET AL., supra note 205, at 14-16).
208. Act effective Jan. 1, 2015, ch. 870, 2014 Cal. Stat. 93 (amending CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE
§ 1281.96). The most the amendment accomplished was the inclusion of a statement that "[i]t is the
intent of the Legislature that private arbitration companies comply with all legal obligations of this
section."
209. The response from arbitration administrators would likely be that reporting is costly,
problems are raised by the confidentiality provisions in some agreements and by arbitrator ethical
rules, see AAA COMMERCIAL DISPUTES ETHICS, supra note 168, and there is no uniform reporting
module, This proposal would alleviate some of those concerns by removing confidentiality from
consumer arbitration and enhancing uniformity in reporting. But if consumers are obtaining fair
results in arbitration, or a high settlement ratio, or even one hundred percent business-funded
dispute resolution, one would expect businesses to actively market this consumer-friendly module in
favor of arbitration.
210. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3905(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). But
it may not be the sole reason to refuse to enforce a consumer arbitration award.
211. Section 14-3905(c)(2) provides that "[tihe arbitration organization is liable to the person
bringing the action for an injunction for the person's reasonable attorney's fees and costs if: (i) [t]he
court issues the injunction; or (ii) [t]he arbitration organization voluntarily complies with § 14-3903
of this subtitle after the action is filed." Id. § 14-3905(c)(2).
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over the arbitration service provider's compliance, that is an efficient
allocation of market resources.2 12 The business client of arbitration
providers will necessarily select providers who are compliant so as to
avoid enforcement of the penalty. And in response to demand, arbitral
service providers will comply with reporting requirements.
2.

Data Reporting: The Necessity of Useful Data Fields

Another lesson learned from California Civil Procedure Code section
1281.96 is that for data reporting to be useful, certain fields are
important. The state statutes provide a starting point. The table below
reflects common state statutory requirements that should be retained on
the left, and fields that are necessary for further data evaluation on the
right." 3
Statutory Fields that Should Be
Retained
Case type (goods, credit, banking,
health-care, insurance,
construction, real estate,
telecommunications, personal
injury, debt collection,
employment, etc.) 2 14
If employment, employee wage
range
Whether the consumer was the
prevailing party
Name of the business entity
involved

Additional Fields that Should Be
Required
Nature of the complaint (breach of
warranty, breach of contract,
breach of statutory law, fraud,
personal injury, products liability,
racial or gender discrimination,
unconscionability, etc.)
The product or service involved
Was the consumer the plaintiff?
Was the business entity
represented by an attorney?

212. There is the possibility that an arbitration service provider could conduct so few consumer or
employee arbitrations that application of a civil penalty to it would be onerous. Thus, the datareporting requirement could be limited to those providers that conduct fifty or more consumer or
employee disputes per year. Cf D.C. CODE § 16-4430 (LEXIS through Sept. 16, 2015) (limiting
applicability to arbitration organizations "involved in 50 or more consumer arbitrations a year").
"Consumer" should be broadly construed to include, for example, services arising out of health-care
from medical providers or consumer/employee contracts with health-insurance providers.
213. To reduce the burden on arbitration administrators and enhance uniformity in reporting, I
propose that the legislation adopting this approach specify a detailed coding grid that should be used
for reporting purposes.
214. As noted above, California Civil Procedure Code section 1281.96 was recently amended to
require more detail in the nature of the dispute. Act effective Jan. 1, 2015, ch. 870, 2014 Cal. Stat.
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Statutory Fields that Should Be
Retained (continued)
Number of times the business has
been a party to arbitration in which
the provider was involved
Whether the consumer was
represented by an attorney
Date the service provider received
the demand, date arbitrator was
appointed, and date of disposition
rendered
Type of disposition (withdrawal,
abandonment, settlement, award
post hearing, award without
hearing, default or dismissal)
Amount of the claim

Amount of the award
Arbitrator's name

Amount of arbitrator's fee
Percentage of fee paid by each
party
Whether the provider currently has,
or had within the preceding year, a
financial interest in a party or legal
representative of a party, or
whether a party or legal
representative of a party had a
financial interest in the provider.

[Vol. 90:1727

Additional Fields that Should Be
Required (continued)
Name and address of the business
entity's attorney representative, if
any
The name and address of the
consumer's attorney
representative 1z 5
Was a hearing held? Was it
telephonic? In-person?

Address at21which
any hearing was
conducted 6

Were any counter-claims raised?
What was the nature of such
claims and amount?
Was the claim determined to be
frivolous?
Number of times the arbitrator has
handled a case involving the
business entity involved in this
dispute
Amount of administrative fees
Percentage of administrative fees
paid by each party
Components of the award (Any
premium awarded? Attorney's
fees? 21 7 Punitive damages or civil
penalties?)

215. Maryland Commercial Law section 14-3903 requires the name of the consumer attorney, as
does the amended California Civil Procedure Code section 1281.96. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW
§ 14-3903; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.),
amended by Act effective Jan. 1, 2015, ch. 870, 2014 Cal. Stat. 93.
216. To determine proximity to the plaintiff-disputant.
217. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96, amended by Act effective Jan. 1, 2015, ch. 870, 2014 Cal.
Stat. 93 (requiring disclosure of awarded attorney's fees).
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Statutory Fields that Should Be
Retained (continued)
Fee waiver 21
requested?
8
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Additional Fields that Should Be
Required (continued)
Total time to claim resolution

Approved?

If withdrawn, basis for withdrawal
(e.g., nonpayment of fees?
Disqualification of a party?)
Was discovery permitted?
Was the arbitration asserted as a
class?
Did the arbitration proceed as a
class?
Reporting this additional information serves a number of purposes.
First, more detailed information about the nature of the claim and the
product or service involved provides important messaging to consumers,
federal regulatory agencies, and state attorneys general that something
may be amiss when similar claims increase in filing. This transparency
helps diminish the loss of publicity of public court proceedings
discussed in Part II.D, supra. Additionally, providing the name of the
consumer attorney could be a helpful resource to consumers seeking
arbitration assistance for a similar claim. Requiring information about
whether the business is represented by counsel and the name of such
counsel will provide another layer of inquiry into the potential problem
of repeat-player bias. Information about counterclaims and their basis is
essential to understanding any arbitral award. Further, to understand
whether arbitral awards are fair, and whether consumer-incentive
premiums offer anything but an illusory promise, we need to know the
specific components of the award. Similarly, if the arbitrator determined
that a claim is frivolous, this may mean a consumer pays a higher
portion of fees. This information would be very important in evaluating
the fairness of "consumer-friendly" arbitration provisions. Finally,
information about whether the demand was lodged or proceeded as a
class will provide helpful information in elucidating what occurs in class
arbitration as opposed to individual arbitration.
One thing should be clear when analyzing the data-reporting
requirements. To comply, the arbitration cannot be confidential." 9 The
218. These requirements were added by 2014 amendment to section 1281.96 of the California
Civil Procedure Code. Id.
219. See Melworm, supra note 124, at 470 ("The best way to address issues of arbitrator bias,
therefore, is to ensure that from the onset, arbitrators are required to openly and broadly disclose
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waiver of confidentiality is an inherent feature of required data reporting
and one that should be adopted without question in underdog arbitration.
For business-to-business arbitration, one can easily see the efficacy of
confidentiality. It secures the confidentiality of trade secrets, business
agreements, profits, and settlements. But for business-to-consumer or
business-to-employee disputes, the benefits of confidentiality fade. A
business may claim that confidentiality prevents more consumers from
knowing about a meritorious claim and thus reduces filing of claims. But
permitting businesses to hide wrongful practices in the shadow of
arbitration has never been the purpose of a theoretically fair alternative
dispute resolution forum. Indeed, if, as arbitration proponents such as
myself contend, arbitration is fair then its players should be willing
participants in disclosing this data to the public. As a price to arbitration
entry, it would be an implicit waiver of the ability to require
confidentiality of the required data fields.
3.

Making the Data Useful: The Necessity of a Uniform ConsumerFriendly Reporting Mechanism

Most of the state statutes requiring data reporting specify that
information be available to the public in a "computer-searchable"
database.220 But as we know from the California experience, this phrase
has been interpreted to mean a simple text file (with the exception of the
AAA, which does provide useful data in a searchable format),2 2' which
has been unhelpful for research purposes and is not useful to a
consumer.222 The California Judiciary Committee recommended that a
"fundamental improvement" to section 1281.96 is to require a
spreadsheet format for the reporting mechanism. 223 California did make
some progress by amending its statutory disclosure requirement this past
year to require disclosure in a "single cumulative report' 224 "in a format
that allows the public to search and sort the information using readily

prior relationships and dealings that may overlap or intertwine with the pending arbitration.").
220. CAL. CFV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96; D.C. CODE § 16-4430 (LEXIS through Sept. 16, 2015);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). Maryland's statute
does not specify the form of the data, but does require that it be available to the public. MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903.
221. The AAA provides consumer arbitration statistics in spreadsheet format in its Provider
Organization Report. See ProviderOrganizationReport, supra note 200.
222. BAKER, supranote 203, at 10.
223. Id.

224. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a).
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available software.

2 25

My proposal would go one step further. I recommend that Congress
adopt a spreadsheet format with the data fields implemented as columns.
Each arbitration provider should be required to use the approved
electronic form and publish it on the provider website, thereby achieving
uniformity and accessibility among providers and among the states in a
format that is user-friendly for researchers, academics, lawyers, state
attorneys general, consumers, and employees.
B.

The FAA Should Require Arbitratorsin Consumer andEmployee
Disputes to Issue a Statement ofDecision

The second part of my proposal to increase transparency in "underdog
arbitration" is to amend the FAA and adopt uniform state requirements
that each arbitrator of a consumer or employment claim issue a
statement of decision. As noted above, the lack of a record from the
arbitrator presents some troubling concerns. It inhibits the rule of law by
privatizing these decisions. 226 It means that different arbitrators may
reach conflicting decisions on the same issue without ever being aware
of a similarly situated decision-maker's result. It removes an important
messaging mechanism served by our open courts to businesses and the
public about potentially wrongful business practices or products. And it
means that a reviewing court (to the extent there is judicial review) may
have no basis for evaluating the arbitrator's understanding of the law or
rationale in reaching a decision.
Recognizing these concerns of unbridled adjudicatory power, a
number of commentators have advocated for the requirement of a
written decision when arbitrators decide employee or consumer cases.
After its 2010 study of consumer debt collection practices, the FTC
concluded that "arbitrators should issue reasoned opinions to accompany
awards

in

all

debt

collection

arbitration

proceedings.'

227

Not

surprisingly, the FTC found that the benefit of such opinions is that it
would help the parties understand the rationale for the amounts the
arbitrators awarded, would assist with judicial review of such decisions,
and would help inform public assessment of private debt collection
arbitration proceedings.228
Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole takes a similar position. Professor Cole
225. Id. § 1281.96(b).
226. See supra Part II.C.
227. FTC CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION REPORT, supranote 21, at 64.
228. Id.
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proposes that private arbitrator providers require arbitrators to "draft
reasoned written opinions. 2 29 Professor Cole's proposal would require
the arbitrator to identify the issues in dispute, use the parties' posthearing briefs and hearing evidence to identify the parties' contentions,
state the decision, interpret the evidence, resolve questions of fact, apply
principles of law and custom, and explain why he or she accepted or
rejected the parties' theories.2 30 Finally, the opinion must describe the
award and its consequences for the disputants.2 3 1
There is an added benefit to requiring a statement of decision from the
arbitrator in addition to the important message it sends to the public. As
any judge, law clerk, professor, or indeed law student knows, there is an
educational function to the writing process. By putting the law and the
application of the facts to the page, one comes to understand it in a way
one had not previously comprehended, and the requirement of the
writing process may indeed lead a person to a result different from what
one originally thought. Nonetheless, the danger in requiring an online
publishable statement of decision from an arbitrator is that it will
increase the cost and complexity of arbitral decisions. Thus, while I
agree with Professor Cole's proposal in spirit-that there should be
some written decision reflecting the arbitrator's decision in a consumer
or employee arbitration case-I propose a more simplified approach.
My proposal specifically rejects the necessity of a legal opinion that
would explain in detail the resolution of all fact issues and the rationale
for accepting or rejecting the various theories. Instead, my statement of
decision would require two components: (1) a statement of the
applicable law and (2) application of the facts (as the arbitrator
determined them to be credible) to that law. 232 Requiring this statement
of decision would allow the public to know if arbitrators are engaging in
manifest disregard of the law and inherently would put pressure on
arbitrators to resist this temptation. Additionally, while requiring a
decision statement would admittedly increase the burden on arbitrators,
that burden is not significant. First, confidence in arbitration is based, in
229. Cole, supra note 158, at 327.
230. Id. at 304-05; see also, e.g., Burch, supra note 122, at 81-82 (advocating for reasoned
opinions in pre-dispute mandatory arbitration and claiming that "the benefits of reasoned opinions
outweigh their costs and would improve the procedural fairness of mandatory arbitration for the
parties subjected to it").
231. See Cole, supra note 158, at 305.
232. Cf FTC CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION REPORT, supra note 21, at 64 (requiring the
proposed opinion to "state the law applied, explain the application of the law to the facts, and set
forth a calculation of the amount awarded, including breaking the amount into principal, interest,
and fees").
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part, on the belief that an industry expert selected as an arbitrator will
have more experience and ease in resolving a dispute, thereby increasing
the efficiency of the dispute resolution process. Such decisions should be
no great effort for industry legal experts who are knowledgeable in the
law. Second, the effort perceived is no more than we expect of even
first-year law students on exams-to identify the issue based on the facts
presented by the parties, state the law, and apply it.2 33 Again, acceptance
of some increased complexity to ensure a transparent process is
appropriate when balanced with the risks a complete lack of decision
provides. Indeed, as exemplified by the Netflix agreement cited above,
some industry providers are already moving to the contractual
requirement of a statement of decision.234
C.

The FAA Should Require Business Entities That Require Binding
Pre-DisputeArbitrationfor Consumers or Employees to Annually
Report Data on the Extent and Nature of Such Arbitrations

The third and final piece of my proposal to lend transparency to
arbitration for "underdog" disputes is to require a dual prong of data
reporting. The first prong recommends imposing data reporting on the
arbitral service provider. This prong requires data reporting by those
entities that would enter this alternative dispute arena. Congress should
amend the FAA to require business entities that require binding predispute arbitration for consumers or employees to annually report and
make publically available data regarding arbitration claims and their
outcomes. Initially, data for consumer claims should be reported to the
FTC, the entity charged with "protect[ing] consumers by stopping
unfair, deceptive or fraudulent practices in the marketplace., 235 Data for
employment arbitration should be provided to the Department of Labor,
the federal department charged with "foster[ing], promot[ing] and
develop[ing] the welfare of the wage earners, job seekers, and retirees of
the United States., 236 But the real value in the data-reporting
requirement is that the data must be publicly available. Thus, the data
would be available and useful to other federal agencies, such as the

233. The caveat is that a failure to apply the correct law for an arbitrator may mean a loss of
business as opposed to a below-curve grade on the exam.
234. Netflix Terms of Use, supra note 96, § 15.
235. What We Do, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last
visited Nov. 7, 2015).
236. Our Mission, U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB., http://www.dol.gov/opa/aboutdol/mission.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2015).

1776

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1727

CFPB and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). It
would also be available for state attorneys general to research potential
patterns of deceptive trade practices that might otherwise go unnoticed
through the veil of arbitration. Finally, the data would be available to
consumer and consumer reporting agencies such as Consumer Reports.
This information would be helpful in determining whether, for example,
to seek employment with a particular employer or whether to buy a
particular product. A consumer might be dissuaded from purchasing a
product, for example, if the consumer sees that hundreds of arbitration
claims have been filed regarding a particular product model, regardless
of the outcome of those arbitrations. The very presence of numerous
claims suggests that something is amiss that may not justify the cost or
cost-savings. No doubt publications whose very mission is to provide
consumers information about product utility would find this information
important in assessing value.
One question might be, why require data reporting from both the
arbitration service provider and the business/disputant? 37 Requiring
businesses to report data to the public would necessitate business selfanalysis. Once a company must make information about claims public,
consumer marketing is more likely to assess the information. Then, for
example, if it becomes clear that the company is receiving the benefit of
repeat-player bias, this becomes a marketing problem both for the
company and for pre-dispute mandatory arbitration.238 Similarly, once a
company is aware that it must make the number of claims and the result
public, it will necessarily become concerned with correcting perceived
discrimination or deceptive trade practices based on the data to avoid
investigation by state attorneys general or the EEOC and to avoid public
boycott. Additionally, reporting at the business level provides an easyaccess point for consumers interested in claims data based on product or
manufacturer type. The recent CFPB Arbitration Study tells us that most
consumers do not know if they can sue their credit card provider in
court. 239 It would be expecting much more of a consumer to know he or
237. Thank you to Professor Christopher Drahozal for raising this question, among others, in
response to a draft of this Article.
238. As an example of the power of the marketplace, consider the story of General Mills, which
adopted a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement for its products this summer. After
significant negative market reaction (which may have been based on some misperceptions of
arbitration discussed in this Article), General Mills recanted the terms. See Kirstie Foster, We've
Listened - and We're Changing Our Legal Terms Back, TASTE GEN. MILLS (Apr. 19, 2014),
http://www.blog.generalmills.com/2014/04/weve-listened-and-were-changing-our-legal-terms-backto-what-they-were/.
239. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note I, § 3.4.3, at 18-19, 19 thl.l. Overall, fifty-two
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she could search a uniform database to extrapolate claims information in
arbitration regarding a particular product or manufacturer.24 ° Providing
this information on a company website would be more likely to reach the
target audience, the consumer.
So what form should the data-reporting requirement take? As with
data reporting at the arbitral service level, some uniformity is necessary.
The data reported should be in a uniform form or spreadsheet, much like
an SEC filing. And what data should be required? This proposal seeks
the basic information a researcher and/or prospective stakeholder would
want. The business entity should report:
1. The number of arbitration claims filed in which it was a
defendant;
2. Whether it was an employment or consumer claim;
3. The product or service that was the basis of claim;
4. The defect or practice complained of,
5. The arbitrator used (service and provider);
6. The outcome (win, loss, settle, default, or withdrawal);
7. Damages awarded; and
8. Fees and costs awarded.
The major criticism to data reporting at the business-player level is
that it will increase the complexity of arbitration, which by its nature is
attractive due to its low-cost and efficiency. But there are many reports
that business entities already must file: corporate registrations, annual
business designations, and SEC reports are just a few examples. For
example, to participate in the market as a publicly-held company, the
business entity is required to comply with multiple SEC reporting
requirements. By analogy, this amendment to the FAA to require
relatively simplistic data reporting could be seen as the cost of entry to
alternative dispute resolution when the consumer/employee has no
bargaining power. In other words, to play the game, you have to pay the
cost of entry, which is data reporting designed to provide information to
the public. Additionally, as noted above, to the extent underdog
arbitration is a fair alternative venue to the courts, the business entities
percent of consumers did not know if he or she had the right to sue in court. Id. at 18. Of those who
believed they could sue in court and were actually subject to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement,
eighty percent were wrong, even adjusting for small-claims court carve-outs. Id. at 20-21.
240. Although consumers may care little about dispute resolution procedures at the time of
product acquisition (which may be due to a variety of factors including lack of knowledge about
arbitration or lack of choice), consumers would likely care a great deal about product performance.
If a consumer could find data on product claims, this could serve as a useful signpost for product
performance.
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preferring this resolution model should be more than willing to deliver
the data illustrating it.
D.

IncreasedTransparency:A Step in the Right Direction,but Not a
Panacea

The goal advanced by the proposal set forth above is to increase
transparency and tools for assessment in an area in which little is still
known about consumer, and to a lesser degree, employment arbitration.
Even still, there are some inherent limitations in the proposal for data
collection and decisional reporting. First, a significant limitation is that
even with enhanced uniformity in reporting, problems will still likely
persist with interpretation in coding. For example, an analysis of the
amount claimed in arbitration is an important variable. The Searle Civil
Justice Institute Report on Consumer Arbitration conducted a study of
301 AAA consumer arbitrations. But the study found that "determining
the amount claimed turns out to be more difficult than sometimes
assumed., 241 This is because claimants often combine different damage
elements, compensatory damages, interest, attorneys' fees, or punitive
damages, into a single claim amount.242 Additionally, some claimants
specify the claim amount not as a single number, but a range.2 43 Still
further, the Searle Civil Justice Institute Report found several
inconsistencies between the AAA reporting of award claim and amount
and its own findings due to the compounding of compensatory damages
with other damage categories. 244
A more theoretical infirmity in the above proposal concerns the use of
such data. As evidenced by the debate between Public Citizen and
others, simply assessing a consumer "win-rate" in arbitration, or
percentage of recovery versus amount claimed, cannot demonstrate
whether arbitration is inherently "fair," although it is useful information
in capturing the big picture.245 One method of assessing arbitration
would be to compare arbitration results with litigation results, but many
241. SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY, supranote 10, at 47.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.at 40.
245. See id.at 9. Compare PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: How CREDIT CARD
COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
ArbitrationTrap.pdf, with Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, EmpiricalResearch on Consumer
Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (2009) (pointing out that
emphasis on "wins" vs. "losses" in consumer-collection arbitration misses the point that a reduction
in a claim asserted by a business against the consumer could be perceived as a win).
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factors make this comparison difficult. 246 The cases assessed must be
similar, and one should take into account that arbitration fees may be
lower (or nonexistent), encouraging more filings that are less likely to
succeed. Additionally, dispositive motions are used with greater
frequency in litigation.247 And it would be almost impossible to gauge
the loss or benefit to consumers from waiving the class device and
having the ability to proceed individually to arbitration, particularly
when the arbitration is funded by the business. Even though it is unlikely
that a precise "apples to apples" comparison could be achieved, the
information gleaned from the reporting called for in this proposal would
help policy-makers understand the events occurring in consumer
arbitration and would encourage ethical practices from business and
arbitration service providers simply due to heightened transparency.
While it may be almost impossible to determine whether a consumer
would have recovered more in court individually, or more abstractly, as
a member of a class, we can obtain sufficient information to determine if
we, as a society, should continue to condone arbitration of consumer and
employee claims.
Finally, a related concern not addressed by this proposal, but certainly
worthy of additional exploration, is the lack of available information
about the prevalence of arbitration agreements in consumer or
employment contexts and the use of certain features. Some studies
providing this information have come to fruition, such as the CFPB
Arbitration Study, which provides an empirical analysis of the
prevalence of arbitration agreements in six consumer financial product
markets.248 A pervasive problem is in obtaining a complete data set
representative of the market.249 One idea for further development is
246. SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 10, at 9-10; Eisenberg & Hill, supra
note 10, at 45 (noting the differences between arbitration and court-resolved disputes lead to
differences in case characteristics and settlement rates).
247. SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY, supranote 10, at 9-10.
248. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 2; see also PUBLIC CITIZEN, FORCED
ARBITRATION UNFAIR AND EVERYWHERE (2009), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
UnfairAndEverywhere.pdf; Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate
Through PredisputeArbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 55, 62 (2004) (examining prevalence and features of arbitration agreements in the consumer
context); Eisenberg et al., supra note 1, 882-83; Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 1, at 16
(analyzing a full set of 293 consumer credit card agreements submitted to the Federal Reserve
pursuant to The Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act (Credit CARD Act)
of 2009) (collecting studies); Amy J. Schmitz, Legislatingin the Light: ConsideringEmpiricalData
in CraftingArbitrationReforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 145 (2010) (describing difficulty in
obtaining actual card agreements for use in empirical analysis).
249. See Schmitz, supra note 248, at 145 (describing difficulty in obtaining credit card
agreements for empirical analyses).
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whether corporate entities availing themselves of the private dispute
forum should be required to provide their arbitration agreements to a
central reporting agency, such as the FTC. For example, the Credit Card
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009250 requires
creditors to provide electronic credit card agreements to the CFPB that it
publishes on its website. 251 The AAA also requires that businesses which
use its service register their consumer arbitration clause with its
"Consumer Clause Registry," which allows online access to the
arbitration clause.252 Additionally, the AAA reviews the consumer
arbitration clause to determine if it "substantially and materially"
complies with the AAA's Consumer Due Process Protocol.2 53 These
consumer agreement databases provide important sources of material for
future empirical work, but are still limited in subject matter. Thus, the
idea of a central repository for consumer and employee arbitration
agreements is a consideration worth further development.
CONCLUSION
The trajectory of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to
consumer and employee pre-dispute arbitration tells us that, for now,
arbitration is a viable alternative forum to the courts. More and more
important consumer and employment claims will be relegated to a
dispute resolution process that at the moment is highly opaque. The
Court's approval of arbitration as an alternative forum is based on the
theoretical perception that arbitration is a fair forum for resolving
consumer and employee disputes, even if those claims involve low-value
damages and even if there was little or no bargaining power in agreeing
to the arbitration clause. But as discussed above, there is little reliable
evidence available to suggest that this theoretical perception of the
fairness of arbitration is correct. And as far as theory goes, the
theoretical criticisms of binding pre-dispute arbitration for employee and
consumer claims have merit. The problems discussed above include the
presence of bias, due in part to the repeat-player effect; the lack of
judicial oversight; the removal of publicity from the proceedings,
including the inhibition of development of the rule of law; and an overall
250. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24,
123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., and 32 U.S.C.).
251. 15 U.S.C. § 1632 (2012); see also Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 1, at 7 (using card
agreements provided under the Credit CARD Act of 2009 as a data set).
ASS'N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/
252. Consumer Clause Registry, AM. ARB.
aoe/gc/consumer (follow "Consumer Clause Registry" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
253. Id.
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public distrust. All of these criticisms stem from a lack of transparency
in the process. Thus, achieving greater transparency will either fortify
public confidence in the process or provide the public with empirical
evidence needed to call its appropriateness into question. Either way,
increased transparency serves the greater public good by providing
concrete information about the resolution process to which so many
underdog claims are being shuffled.
But how to achieve this transparency? I propose a tri-part solution
calling for Congress to amend the FAA and the states to follow through
uniform arbitration laws requiring: (1) Data reporting of arbitration
statistics in consumer and employee claims by the arbitration service
provider; (2) A written statement of decision by the arbitrator stating the
applicable law and applying the facts to that law; and (3) Data reporting
by the businesses seeking to impose mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
on their consumers or employees. By requiring data reporting and
decision statements in "underdog" arbitration, Congress has an
opportunity to strike a middle chord in this debate that is becoming
increasingly political. And arbitration participants, such as businesses
wishing to avoid expensive discovery costs and class proceedings in
court, have an opportunity to put the proverbial proof in the pudding. If
arbitration is fair for consumers, if arbitration can work as it should, then
show us the numbers.
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